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This paper examines the role of agent heterogeneity and learning on wage dispersion and
employment dynamics. In the ￿rst half of the paper, I present an equilibrium matching
model where heterogeneous workers and ￿rms learn about match quality and bargain over
wages. The model generalizes Jovanovic (1979) to the case of heterogeneous workers and
￿rms. Equilibrium wage dispersion arises due to productivity di⁄erences across workers,
technological di⁄erences across ￿rms, and heterogeneity in beliefs about match quality. Un-
der a simple CRS technology, the equilibrium wage is additively separable in worker- and
￿rm-speci￿c components, and in the posterior mean of beliefs about match quality. This
parallels the ￿person and ￿rm e⁄ects￿empirical speci￿cation of Abowd et. al. (1999, AKM)
and others. It consequently provides a theoretical context for the AKM model, and a formal
economic interpretation of their empirical person and ￿rm e⁄ects. The model also yields an
assortative matching result that predicts a negative correlation between estimated person
and ￿rm e⁄ects, which is consistent with most empirical evidence. Finally, the model makes
novel predictions about the relationship between the person and ￿rm e⁄ects and separation
behavior, job duration, and ￿rm size. In the second half of the paper, I test the model￿ s
empirical predictions. I estimate ￿xed and mixed e⁄ects speci￿cations of the equilibrium
wage function on the LEHD database. The mixed e⁄ect speci￿cations generalize the earlier
work of AKM and others. The learning component of the matching model implies a speci￿c
structure for the error covariance. I exploit this structure to test whether earnings residuals
are consistent with Bayesian learning, and to estimate structural parameters of the matching
model. I ￿nd considerable support for the matching model in these data.1 Introduction
It is well known that otherwise identical workers often earn very di⁄erent wages and have
heterogeneous employment histories. Likewise, similar ￿rms frequently pay dissimilar wages
and exhibit great heterogeneity in turnover. However, despite the best e⁄orts of many re-
searchers, we have yet to fully explain this enormous variety of outcomes. A convincing
explanation of why similar workers earn di⁄erent wages, and how this is related to hetero-
geneity in job duration, unemployment, and the like, is central to our understanding of labor
markets, and a necessary input to informed labor market policy.
Early work sought to explain wage di⁄erences across workers on the basis of variation
in human capital and the non-pecuniary aspects of jobs. But observable characteristics of
workers and ￿rms usually only explain about 30 percent of wage variation. Attempts to ex-
plain the residual component of wage variation, often called wage dispersion, have proceeded
along several dimensions. Search and matching models reveal that labor market frictions are
one cause of equilibrium wage dispersion and unemployment. Learning models provide an
explanation for wage dynamics and separation behavior, and show that heterogeneous beliefs
about match productivity are another source of wage dispersion. And recent empirical work
using linked employer-employee data shows that wage dispersion can be decomposed into
a component attributable to unobserved characteristics of the worker ￿a ￿person e⁄ect￿￿
and a component attributable to unobserved characteristics of the employer ￿a ￿￿rm e⁄ect.￿
Each of these provides a partial explanation for the diversity of labor market outcomes. To
date, however, they have remained distinct. This paper demonstrates that they are comple-
mentary. Together, they not only provide a comprehensive explanation for heterogeneity in
labor market outcomes, they also provide important new insights.
The paper has both theoretical and empirical components, and makes contributions in
both dimensions. In the ￿rst half of the paper, I present an equilibrium matching model
where heterogeneous workers and ￿rms learn about match quality and bargain over wages.
The main theoretical innovation is to embed learning about match quality in a Mortensen-
Pissarides style equilibrium matching model with heterogeneous agents. This delivers novel
insights into the relationship between worker and ￿rm heterogeneity, wages, and separation
behavior.
One contribution of the matching model is to generalize the canonical Jovanovic (1979)
model to the case of heterogeneous workers and ￿rms. Traditional matching models provide
an explanation for job duration and turnover: matches last as long as agents believe the
match is good (highly productive). If they learn that match productivity is low, they prefer
to separate. However, a fundamental limitation of models with homogeneous agents is that
they cannot explain why some workers experience consistently longer job duration than oth-
ers, and why some ￿rms experience less turnover than others. In the model presented here,
workers and ￿rms vary in their marginal productivity. The productivity of a worker-￿rm
match depends on worker and ￿rm productivity, and on a match-speci￿c interaction that I
call match quality. Workers and ￿rms learn the value of match quality slowly by observing
production outcomes. Like traditional matching models, they terminate the employment
relationship if they learn that match quality is poor, i.e., if beliefs about match quality fall
below a reservation value. A key result is that the reservation value is decreasing in both
the worker￿ s and the ￿rm￿ s productivity. Consequently, more productive workers experience
1longer average job duration than less productive workers. Likewise, ￿rms with more pro-
ductive technologies experience less turnover than less productive ￿rms. This is consistent
with empirical evidence, and provides an explanation for heterogeneity in job duration and
turnover.
Distinguishing between worker, ￿rm, and match heterogeneity is an important departure
from earlier research. It recognizes that workers are di⁄erently able, and hence some are
more productive on average than others. Likewise, it recognizes that ￿rms operate di⁄erent
production technologies, and consequently employee productivity varies across ￿rms. It
also recognizes that not all workers are equally suited to all production technologies. As a
consequence, two workers that are equally able may be di⁄erently productive in a given ￿rm,
simply because one is well suited to the ￿rm￿ s production technology and the other is not.
It is easy to construct real world examples of this phenomenon. For instance, two equally
able academics may have di⁄erent proclivities for teaching and research. One will thrive in
a university that emphasizes research while the other￿ s productivity su⁄ers. The reverse will
be true in a university that emphasizes teaching.
The very heterogeneous production environment considered here has important impli-
cations for equilibrium wages. When production is according to a simple CRS technology
and wages are set by a Nash bargain, the equilibrium wage is additively-separable in a
worker-speci￿c component, a ￿rm-speci￿c component, and the mean of beliefs about match
quality. The worker- and ￿rm-speci￿c components re￿ ect worker and ￿rm productivity, ad-
justed for bargaining strength and discounting. This result is important for several reasons.
First, it provides a rich explanation for wage dispersion: equilibrium dispersion arises due to
productivity di⁄erences between workers, technological di⁄erences between ￿rms, and due
to heterogeneity in beliefs about match quality. Second, the additively-separable structure
parallels the empirical person and ￿rm e⁄ect speci￿cation that Abowd et al. (1999, AKM,
hereafter) and others have estimated on linked employer-employee data. This speci￿cation
typically ￿explains￿about 90 percent of observed wage variation. However, the AKM de-
composition of wages into person and ￿rm e⁄ects is purely statistical. It provides no formal
economic interpretation of what the person and ￿rm e⁄ects actually measure. Thus the
matching model makes an important contribution to the empirical literature. It provides a
theoretical context for the AKM speci￿cation, and consequently a formal economic interpre-
tation of the person and ￿rm e⁄ects: they re￿ ect productivity di⁄erences across workers and
￿rms, adjusted for bargaining strength and discounting.
The model also provides new insight into the sorting behavior of workers and ￿rms. The
optimal separation policy implies that worker-￿rm matches are negatively assortative. Con-
sequently, the matching model predicts a negative correlation between estimated person and
￿rm e⁄ects. This is in fact what most prior empirical studies have found, but it has been
considered something of an empirical puzzle. The model provides an intuitive explanation
for this ￿nding. Because high-productivity workers have a high opportunity cost of unem-
ployment, they are willing to match with low-productivity ￿rms. Likewise, when highly-
productive ￿rms have an un￿lled vacancy, they forego more output than low-productivity
￿rms do. They are consequently willing to match with low-productivity workers to avoid an
un￿lled vacancy. The result is equilibrium mismatch.
In the second half of the paper, I estimate structural parameters of the matching model
using linked employer-employee data, and test a variety of its predictions. The main econo-
2metric innovation is to estimate a mixed model of earnings that treats the person and ￿rm
e⁄ects as random. This speci￿cation generalizes the ￿xed e⁄ect estimator that AKM and
others have used, and provides novel insight into several sources of bias in earlier estimates.
The most general speci￿cation that I estimate allows a completely unrestricted within-match
error covariance. This is in contrast to the matching model, where learning about match
quality implies a structured error covariance. I exploit this result to test whether earnings
residuals are consistent with Bayesian learning. We cannot reject this hypothesis with a high
degree of con￿dence.
The empirical results show that worker heterogeneity contributes about twice as much
to wage dispersion as ￿rm heterogeneity and learning about match quality do. Learning
is very rapid: about half of the uncertainty is resolved in the ￿rst year of an employment
relationship. Consistent with the prediction of the matching model, I ￿nd that larger values
of the person and ￿rm e⁄ects are associated with longer average job duration.
The AKM estimator has been criticized for relying on an exogenous mobility assump-
tion.1 This requires that employment mobility depend only on observable characteristics
and the person and ￿rm e⁄ects, and be independent of wage errors. The matching model
presented here makes an important contribution in this regard. It demonstrates that the
additively-separable AKM structure can arise even in the presence of endogenous separations
due to learning about match quality. However, these endogenous separations truncate the
error distribution. Failing to correct for truncation may bias estimates of the person and
￿rm e⁄ects. I therefore develop a simple correction based on the Heckman (1979) two-step
estimator. I ￿nd the correction has little in￿ uence on parameter estimates, which implies
the bias is small.
Barth and Dale-Olsen (2003) and Andrews et al. (2004b) have raised another criticism
of the AKM estimator. They argue that the ￿xed e⁄ect estimator yields biased estimates of
the correlation between person and ￿rm e⁄ects. In particular, when the true correlation is
positive, they demonstrate that the estimated correlation is biased downward. I ￿nd some
corroborating empirical evidence. In particular, I ￿nd that ￿xed and mixed e⁄ect estimators
that assume spherical errors show no economically signi￿cant correlation between estimated
person and ￿rm e⁄ects. However, the estimated correlation between person and ￿rm e⁄ects
increases dramatically when the speci￿cation admits correlated errors within worker-￿rm
matches. This suggests the bias is not a consequence of the ￿xed e⁄ects estimator per se,
but rather a consequence of mis-specifying the error distribution.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. I begin by brie￿ y reviewing the
related literature. I then present the matching model in Section 2, and develop the empirical
speci￿cation in Section 3. I give a brief description of the data in Section 4 (more detail is
provided in a Data Appendix). I present the empirical results in Section 5 and conclude in
Section 6.
1.1 Related Literature
The model presented here brings together three distinct literatures: that on search and
matching with heterogeneous agents, the literature on learning in labor markets, and the
1Recent instances of this criticism include Gruetter and Lalive (2004) and Gruetter (2005).
3emerging empirical literature that seeks to explain wage dispersion using linked employer-
employee data. In this section, I brie￿ y review relevant research in each of these areas.
1.1.1 Search and Matching with Heterogeneous Agents
In general, the search and matching literature has focused on economies with heterogeneous
workers and jobs.2 In the typical model, ￿rms employ only a single worker. There is therefore
no distinction between heterogeneity at the level of the ￿rm and at the level of the worker-￿rm
match. In contrast, I model an economy where ￿rms employ many workers, and distinguish
between productive heterogeneity at the ￿rm, which a⁄ects all employees, and productive
heterogeneity that is speci￿c to a worker-￿rm match. Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) also
consider an environment where ￿rms employ many workers, though their workers are equally
productive in every ￿rm.
Recently, interest has focused on conditions under which ￿good￿workers sort into ￿good￿
￿rms in frictional economies. Shimer and Smith (2000) develop conditions under which assor-
tative matching arises in the presence of search frictions. Shimer (2005) considers the optimal
assignment of workers to jobs in the presence of coordination frictions. In either case, pos-
itive assortative matching arises if production exhibits su¢ cient complementarity between
worker and ￿rm types, or if high-productivity workers enjoy su¢ cient comparative advantage
in high-productivity ￿rms. Negative assortative matching arises in the reverse case. In the
matching model presented here, the production technology is additively separable in worker
and ￿rm productivities. This implies low-productivity workers have comparative advantage
in high-productivity ￿rms. Worker-￿rm matches are therefore negatively assortative in equi-
librium, and the model predicts a negative correlation between person and ￿rm e⁄ects. This
is consistent with empirical studies based on European data, though American data typically
yield no signi￿cant correlation between person and ￿rm e⁄ects.3
1.1.2 Learning in Labor Markets
The learning literature has focused primarily on wage and turnover dynamics. The seminal
Jovanovic (1979) model considered the case where identical workers and ￿rms learn about the
quality of a match. Flinn (1986) and Moscarini (2003) generalize the canonical model to the
case of heterogeneous workers. Harris and Holmstrom (1982) and Farber and Gibbons (1996)
present models where workers and ￿rms learn about a worker￿ s unobservable ability, which
is correlated with observable characteristics. Gibbons et al. (2005) extend this framework to
the case of an economy with heterogeneous sectors (e.g., occupation or industry), and where
workers exhibit comparative advantage in some sectors. Felli and Harris (1996) present a
model where workers learn about their aptitude for ￿rm-speci￿c tasks. None of these earlier
works consider the case of worker, ￿rm, and match heterogeneity.
2Examples include Stern (1990), Sattinger (1995), Shimer and Smith (2000), and Shimer and Smith
(2001). Albrecht and Vroman (2002), Gautier (2002), and Kohns (2000) develop models with exogenous
heterogeneity on one side of the market, and endogenous heterogeneity on the other.
3Abowd et al. (2002) and Abowd et al. (2004) report a negative correlation in French data, and ap-
proximately zero correlation in American data. Gruetter and Lalive (2004) ￿nd a negative correlation in
Austrian data, Barth and Dale-Olsen (2003) ￿nd a negative correlation in Norwegian data, and Andrews
et al. (2004a) ￿nd no signi￿cant correlation in German data.
41.1.3 Estimating Person and Firm E⁄ects
I estimate both ￿xed and mixed e⁄ect speci￿cations of the equilibrium wage function. All
prior studies are based on the ￿xed e⁄ect estimator of person and ￿rm e⁄ects. These include
AKM, Abowd et al. (2002, ACK hereafter), Abowd et al. (2003), Abowd et al. (2004),
Abowd et al. (2005), Andersson et al. (2005), Barth and Dale-Olsen (2003), Gruetter and
Lalive (2004), and Andrews et al. (2004a). The empirical speci￿cation considered by these
authors, which I refer to generically as the AKM model, is
yijt = ￿ + x
0
it￿ + ￿i +  j + "ijt (1)
where i indexes workers and j indexes ￿rms, yijt is log earnings, ￿ is the grand mean, xit is
a vector of covariates, ￿ is a parameter vector, ￿i is the person e⁄ect,  j is the ￿rm e⁄ect,
and "ijt is statistical error. The original AKM study relies on approximate solutions for the
estimated person and ￿rm e⁄ects. Most subsequent studies are based on exact solutions
using computational methods developed in ACK.
Economists have historically preferred ￿xed e⁄ect estimators to mixed e⁄ect estimators
that treat unobserved heterogeneity as random. Statisticians, on the other hand, generally
prefer the mixed model because mixed e⁄ect estimates of the unobserved heterogeneity
(here, the estimated person and ￿rm e⁄ects) have better sampling properties. Robinson
(1991) gives an extended discussion along these lines. Furthermore, it is well known (among
statisticians) that the ￿xed e⁄ect estimator is a special case of the mixed e⁄ect estimator.
This is demonstrated in most statistical references on mixed model theory, e.g., Searle et al.
(1992) and McCulloch and Searle (2001). Contrary to popular belief among economists, the
mixed e⁄ect estimator does not necessarily assume that the design of the random e⁄ects is
orthogonal to observable characteristics. Abowd and Kramarz (1999) and AKM discuss the
orthogonal design assumption in detail.
2 The Matching Model
The economy is populated by a continuum of in￿nitely-lived workers of measure one. There
is a continuum of ￿rms of measure ￿: All agents are risk neutral and share the common
discount factor 0 < ￿ < 1: Time is discrete.
In each period, workers are endowed with a single indivisible unit of labor that they
supply to production at home or at a ￿rm. Workers vary in their marginal productivity when
employed, denoted a 2 [a0;a1]. Conceptually, a represents the worker￿ s ability, motivation,
and the like. I refer to a as worker quality or ability. Let
a ￿ Fa iid across workers (2)
where Fa is a probability distribution with zero mean, known to all agents. Worker quality
a is exogenous, known to the worker, and observed by the ￿rm when the worker and ￿rm
meet. Note a is not a choice variable. Unemployed workers receive income h 2 R from home
production.4 For simplicity, h includes all search costs, the value of leisure, and the like.
4We can let h vary across individuals without changing any key theoretical results. However it changes
the interpretation of the person-speci￿c component of wages (Section 2.2.3), the person-speci￿c term in the
reservation level of beliefs (Section 2.2.4), and complicates the comparative statics in Section 2.3.
5Workers seek to maximize the expected present value of wages.
Firms employ many workers. They operate in a competitive output market and produce
a homogeneous good whose price is normalized to one. Firms can only produce output when
matched with workers. They seek to maximize the expected net revenues of a match: the
expected value of output minus a wage payment to the worker.
Firms vary in their technology, which determines the marginal productivity of all their
employees, denoted b 2 [b0;b1]. Let
b ￿ Fb iid across ￿rms (3)
where Fb is a probability distribution known to all agents, and with zero mean. I call b ￿rm
quality. Firms know their own value of b; and it is observed by the worker when the worker
and ￿rm meet. Note b is exogenous. Firms are free to open vacancies.5 They incur cost ￿(l)
to hire l workers in the current period. Assume ￿ is continuous, increasing, and convex.
The marginal productivity of a type a worker when employed at a type b ￿rm depends
not only on worker and ￿rm quality, but also on a worker- and ￿rm-speci￿c interaction that
I call match quality and denote c: ￿Good￿matches are more productive than ￿bad￿ones,







iid across matches. (4)
The normality assumption follows Jovanovic (1979) and others. It yields a convenient closed
form for beliefs about match quality.
Match quality c is a pure experience good. It is unobserved by either the worker or the
￿rm. They learn its value slowly. When the worker and ￿rm meet, they observe the noisy







iid across matches. (5)
The worker and ￿rm￿ s initial beliefs about c are based on a common prior and the signal
x: They subsequently update their beliefs about c on the basis of output realizations. Prior
beliefs and the updating process are discussed in Section 2.1. Note that information is
incomplete, since c is unobserved, but is symmetric. That is, the worker and ￿rm both know
a and b; and observe the same signals about c. They therefore share common beliefs about
c at every point in time.
Output is produced according to the constant returns to scale production function:
q￿ = ￿ + a + b + c + e￿ (6)
where ￿ indexes tenure (the duration of the match), ￿ is the grand mean of productivity







iid across matches and tenure. (7)
Note the Jovanovic (1979) production technology is a (continuous time) special case of (6)
where workers and ￿rms are homogeneous. Note also that there are no aggregate shocks to
5Firm-speci￿c vacancy-opening costs do not a⁄ect any of the main results, but introduce an additional
source of ￿rm-level heterogeneity in hiring and employment growth.
6productivity, and no human capital accumulation over the life cycle.6 Since a; b; and ￿ are
known, agents extract the noisy signal of match quality c+e￿ from production outcomes q￿:
Following Flinn (1986), I assume that q￿ is bounded. This implies that the random
variables c;z; and e￿ have bounded support. Thus the distributional assumptions (4), (5),
and (7) are approximate.
Unemployed workers are matched to ￿rms with open vacancies. Search is undirected.
The total number of matches formed in a period is given by m(u;v) where u is the number
of unemployed workers in the economy, and v is the number of open vacancies. Both u and v
are determined endogenously. Assume m is non-decreasing in both u and v: The probability
that a randomly selected unemployed worker will be matched to a ￿rm in the current period
is ￿ ￿ m(u;v)=u: Similarly, the probability that a randomly selected vacancy will be ￿lled
is ￿ ￿ m(u;v)=v: With a large number of workers and ￿rms, all agents take u and v as
given.
As discussed in greater detail below, a match between a worker and ￿rm terminates
endogenously when their point estimate of match quality falls below a threshold value. In
addition, matches terminate with exogenous probability ￿ > 0 in each period.
I restrict attention to steady states of the economy. The economy is in steady state
when the end-of-period distribution of type a workers across employment at type b ￿rms and
across unemployment is constant. The various ￿ ow-balance equations that characterize the
steady state are given in Appendix B. An implication of these is that the steady state level
of unemployment u and the steady state number of vacancies v are constant. Hence so are
the steady state values of ￿ and ￿:
Within-period timing is as follows:
1. With probability ￿; unemployed workers are randomly matched to a ￿rm with an open
vacancy. Upon meeting, agents observe a;b; and the signal x:
2. Workers and ￿rms decide whether or not to continue the match. The decision is based
on all current information about the match: a;b; and current beliefs about c. The
current period wage w￿ is simultaneously determined by a Nash bargain.
3a. If agents decide to terminate the match, the worker enters unemployment and receives
h: There are no ￿ring costs.
3b. If agents decide to continue the match, the negotiated wage is paid to the worker and
output q￿ is produced. Agents update their beliefs about c.
6Introducing a publicly-observable aggregate shock to productivity is relatively straightforward. Likewise,
introducing a deterministic trend to individual productivity (i.e., an ￿experience e⁄ect￿ ) presents no serious
complication provided that it is observable by the worker and ￿rm. I omit these generalizations since
they complicate the exposition considerably ￿both require additional notation and an additional index of
calendar time. However, there is little loss of generality in their omission. The production function (6) can
be considered output net of additive aggregate shocks and deterministically accumulated human capital.
The same is true of the equlibrium wage w￿ in (30) and the net value of output q￿ ￿ w￿: That is, in the
more general model, the equilibrium wage (see Proposition 1) remains additively separable in person- and
￿rm- speci￿c components and in the posterior mean of beliefs, and is linear and additively separable in the
productivity shock and the experience e⁄ect.
74. Exogenous separations occur with probability ￿:
5. Firms open new vacancies ￿:
Assume that reputational considerations preclude agents from reneging on the agreed-
upon wage payment.
2.1 Beliefs About Match Quality
Assume agents￿prior beliefs about a;b;c;z; and e￿ are rational. That is, they are governed by
equations (2), (3), (4), (5), and (7). Recall that the worker￿ s type a and the ￿rm￿ s type b are
observed by both parties when the worker and ￿rm meet. Agents update their beliefs about
match quality c using Bayes￿rule when they acquire new information, i.e., upon observing
the signal x and production outcomes q￿:
After observing the signal x; worker and ￿rm posterior beliefs about c are normally




















In each subsequent period that the match continues, the worker and ￿rm extract the signal
c+e￿ from observed output q￿: Hence at the beginning of the ￿th period of the match (that
is, after observing ￿ ￿1 production outcomes), worker and ￿rm posterior beliefs about match



































Equation (10) demonstrates that the evolution of s2
￿ is deterministic and does not depend
on the value of the signals received. It also shows that s2
￿ > s2
￿+1 for each ￿ > 0: Equation
(9) demonstrates that the posterior mean of beliefs m￿ is a precision-weighted average of the
prior mean m￿￿1 and the most recent signal c + e￿￿1: Since the precision of signals (1=￿2
e)
is constant but the precision of beliefs (1=s2
￿) increases with tenure, each new signal is given
successively smaller weight in the update. Asymptotically, beliefs converge to unit mass at
true match quality. That is,
lim
￿!1m￿ = c and lim
￿!1s
2
￿ = 0: (11)
This is a standard result for Bayesian learning with rational priors.
In what follows, it will be of interest to describe the distribution of beliefs in the popu-
lation. It is easy to show that
















8With a little algebra, one can also show V￿+1 > V￿ for all ￿ > 0: That is, the variance of the
posterior mean of beliefs about match quality increases with the number of signals received.
Another standard result for Bayesian learning with normal priors and signals is
mpjm￿ ￿ N (m￿;vp) (14)
vp =
s4
￿ (p ￿ ￿)
s2
￿ (p ￿ ￿) + ￿2
e
(15)
for any p > ￿: Equation (14) implies the posterior mean of beliefs is a martingale. Conditional
on current information, the expected value of any future realization of m￿ equals its current
value.
2.2 Match Formation, Duration, and Wages
In each period, wages are determined by a Nash bargain between the worker and the ￿rm.
They divide the expected match surplus. They take expectations with respect to tenure
￿ beliefs about match quality, given the worker￿ s quality a and the ￿rm￿ s quality b. The
equilibrium wage therefore maps tenure ￿ information about the match (a;b;m￿;s2
￿) into
a payment from the ￿rm to the worker. Because the Nash bargain is e¢ cient, the match
only continues if the expected surplus is non-negative. Otherwise, the worker and ￿rm both
prefer to separate.
Let J￿ denote the worker￿ s value of employment at tenure ￿: Let U denote the value of
the worker￿ s outside option (unemployment). Let ￿￿ denote the ￿rm￿ s value of employment
at tenure ￿; and let V denote the value of the ￿rm￿ s outside option (a vacancy). In the
steady state, U and V are constant. At tenure ￿; the match continues if and only if
J￿ + ￿￿ ￿ U + V: (16)
When (16) is satis￿ed, the equilibrium wage w￿ solves the Nash bargaining condition
J￿ ￿ U = ￿ [J￿ + ￿￿ ￿ U ￿ V ] (17)
or equivalently,
(1 ￿ ￿)(J￿ ￿ U) = ￿ (￿￿ ￿ V ) (18)
where ￿ is the worker￿ s exogenous share of match surplus.
2.2.1 The Worker￿ s Value of Employment and Unemployment
The worker￿ s expected value of employment at wage w￿ is
J￿ = w￿ + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)E￿ [maxfJ￿+1;Ug] + ￿￿U (19)
where E￿ denotes the expectation taken with respect to tenure ￿ information: (a;b;m￿;s2
￿):
For what follows, it is convenient to rewrite J￿ net of the value of unemployment, i.e.,
J￿ ￿ U = w￿ + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)E￿ [maxfJ￿+1 ￿ U;0g] ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)U: (20)
9The steady state value of being unemployed today and behaving optimally thereafter is





b + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)U (21)
where ￿ is the steady state probability that an unemployed worker is matched to a ￿rm, F ￿
b
is the steady state distribution of ￿rm types among open vacancies de￿ned in Appendix B,
and
J0 = E0 [maxfJ1;Ug] (22)
is the expected value of employment before the initial signal of match quality is observed.
2.2.2 Vacancies and The Firm￿ s Value of Employment
The ￿rm￿ s value of employing a worker at wage w￿ is today￿ s expected net revenues plus the
discounted expected value of employment next period. Thus,
￿￿ = E￿ [q￿] ￿ w￿ + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)E￿ [maxf￿￿+1;V g] + ￿￿V
= ￿ + a + b + m￿ ￿ w￿ + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)E￿ [maxf￿￿+1;V g] + ￿￿V (23)
so that
￿￿ ￿ V = ￿ + a + b + m￿ ￿ w￿ + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)E￿ [maxf￿￿+1 ￿ V;0g] ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)V: (24)
The production technology (6) implies that the ￿rm￿ s employees produce independently
of one another. As a consequence, the ￿rm￿ s decision to open vacancies is static. The
number of hires today has no dynamic consequences for future hiring or productivity. When
a ￿rm opens ￿ vacancies, the number l that are ￿lled is a binomial process. The number of





















where ￿ is the steady state probability that a vacancy is ￿lled, F ￿
a is the steady state distri-
bution of unemployed worker types de￿ned in Appendix B, and
￿0 = E0 [maxf￿1;V g] (26)
is the expected net revenues from a match before the signal x is observed.
Note that ￿rm size (employment) is indeterminate. However, increasing and convex hiring
costs ￿ guarantee the solution to (25) is well de￿ned, and the ￿rm opens a ￿nite number of
vacancies in each period. I derive the average steady state employment of a type b ￿rm in
Appendix B.
The equilibrium value of a vacancy satis￿es V = 0: Since ￿rms are free to open vacan-
cies, they do so until there is no further bene￿t. Equivalently, since hiring costs are sunk,
terminating an employment relationship frees up no resources. Thus the alternative value of
a vacancy is zero.
102.2.3 The Equilibrium Wage
With the value functions in hand, it is a simple matter to solve for the equilibrium wage. It
takes a remarkably simple form, summarized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium Wage) At each tenure ￿ > 0; the equilibrium wage w￿ is
linear and additively separable in a person-speci￿c component, a ￿rm-speci￿c component,
and the posterior mean of beliefs about match quality; and is independent of s2
￿:
Proof. Substituting (20) and (24) into the Nash bargaining condition (18) we obtain
(1 ￿ ￿)(w￿ + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)E￿ [maxfJ￿+1 ￿ U;0g] ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)U)
= ￿ (￿ + a + b + m￿ ￿ w￿ + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)E￿ [maxf￿￿+1 ￿ V;0g] ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)V ): (27)
Condition (18) implies
(1 ￿ ￿)E￿ [maxfJ￿+1 ￿ U;0g] = ￿E￿ [maxf￿￿+1 ￿ V;0g] (28)
and thus
(1 ￿ ￿)(w￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)U) = ￿ (￿ + a + b + m￿ ￿ w￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)V ): (29)
Rearranging yields
w￿ = ￿￿ + ￿ +   + ￿m￿ (30)
where the worker speci￿c component is
￿ = ￿a + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)U (31)
and the ￿rm-speci￿c component is
  = ￿b ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)V = ￿b (32)
given the equilibrium condition V = 0:
The equilibrium wage function (30) has the same additively separable structure as the
AKM empirical speci￿cation (1). In keeping with the empirical literature, I therefore refer to
￿ and   as person and ￿rm e⁄ects, respectively. Equations (31) and (32) provide a behavioral
interpretation of the AKM person and ￿rm e⁄ects. Equation (32) illustrates that the ￿rm
e⁄ect measures the worker￿ s share ￿ of the ￿rm￿ s contribution to match surplus. It linearly re-
scales the ￿rm￿ s productivity b: Rewriting equation (31) as ￿ = ￿ (a ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)U)+(1 ￿ ￿)U
demonstrates that the person e⁄ect is likewise the worker￿ s share of his contribution to
match surplus, plus compensation for forgoing his next-best alternative and adjusted for
discounting. It therefore re￿ ects the worker￿ s productivity a; adjusted for discounting and
bargaining strength.
The Jovanovic (1979) equilibrium wage is a special case of (30). In that model, workers
and ￿rms are identical but matches are heterogeneous, and production occurs according to
the continuous time analog of (6) with a = b = 0 for every worker and ￿rm. The Jovanovic
wage equals expected marginal product, which in that case is also the posterior mean of
beliefs about match quality. This fundamental result relies on the assumption that ￿rms
11earn zero expected pro￿t. Similar to Jovanovic￿ s model, the equilibrium wage (30) is linear
and additively separable in expected marginal product, ￿+a+b+m￿; and in the posterior
mean of beliefs about match quality, m￿. To see that the Jovanovic (1979) equilibrium wage
is in fact a special case of (30), notice that when workers capture the entire match surplus,
i.e., as ￿ ! 1 (so that ￿rms earn zero expected pro￿t), the equilibrium wage approaches
lim￿!1 w￿ = ￿+a+b+m￿: That is, the equilibrium wage converges to the expected marginal
product of the match. With a = b = 0; this is exactly the Jovanovic (1979) equilibrium wage.
The wage function (30) implies rich equilibrium wage dispersion. The person e⁄ect, the
￿rm e⁄ect, and learning about match quality all contribute. Identical workers earn di⁄erent
wages because of employment at heterogeneous ￿rms and because of heterogeneity of beliefs
about match quality. Identical ￿rms pay di⁄erent wages because they employ heterogeneous
workers and because of heterogeneity in beliefs. Even identical workers employed in identical
￿rms earn di⁄erent wages because of dispersion in beliefs about match quality.
2.2.4 The Separation Decision
In the Nash bargaining framework, the separation decision is made jointly by the worker
and ￿rm. The match continues as long as the surplus is non-negative. To characterize the








= maxfJ￿ + ￿￿;U + V g
= max
￿











given the equilibrium condition V = 0: The value function W depends on the complete set
of state variables (a;b;m￿;s2
￿): However, its dependence on a and b is suppressed in (33) for
notational simplicity, and because these quantities do not vary with tenure.
The following Proposition establishes uniqueness of the value function, and its most
important properties with regard to the posterior mean of beliefs about match quality. Its
proof is in Appendix A.
Proposition 2 (Uniqueness) There is a unique value function W that satis￿es the Bell-
man equation (33). Furthermore, W is continuous, nondecreasing, and convex in m￿:
Workers and ￿rms prefer to continue the employment relationship as long as its value
exceeds the value of terminating it. That is, as long as the ￿rst argument of the max
operator in (33) exceeds the second argument. They prefer to terminate the relationship the
￿rst time the inequality is reversed. There are a number of equivalent ways of characterizing
this decision in terms of state variables. The most convenient characterization is in terms
of beliefs about match quality, since other state variables do not vary over the course of the
employment relationship. This characterization corresponds with previous learning models
with homogeneous workers and ￿rms. Proposition 3 summarizes the optimal separation
policy in terms of beliefs about match quality. Its proof is in Appendix A.
Proposition 3 (Optimal Separation Policy) At each tenure ￿ > 0 and for given values
of a and b; the optimal separation policy is characterized by a reservation value of beliefs
12about match quality, ￿ m￿: Speci￿cally, the optimal policy is to separate if m￿ < ￿ m￿; and
continue if m￿ ￿ ￿ m￿:
The reservation level of beliefs about match quality is the value of m￿ at which workers
and ￿rms are indi⁄erent between continuing the employment relation and terminating it.
Thus ￿ m￿ satis￿es the Nash continuation condition (16) with equality. Equivalently, it is the
value of m￿ that equates the arguments of the max function in the Bellman equation (33).
Thus ￿ m￿ is implicitly de￿ned by









where ￿ E￿ denotes the expectation taken with respect to state variables (a;b; ￿ m￿;s2
￿):
It is of considerable interest to characterize how separation behavior evolves with tenure.
Proposition 4 establishes a standard result for equilibrium learning models. Its proof is
appendicized.
Proposition 4 (Monotonicity) The reservation value of beliefs about match quality is
monotone in tenure, i.e., ￿ m￿+1 ￿ ￿ m￿ for all ￿ > 0:
The result in Proposition 4 re￿ ects the option value of employment. Early in the
match, when beliefs about match quality are imprecise, workers and ￿rms are willing to
accept matches of low perceived quality because their point estimate m￿ may be inac-
curate. As the worker and ￿rm acquire more information, their beliefs become increas-
ingly precise. As a consequence, the worker and ￿rm become increasingly selective about
admissible values of match quality, and the reservation value increases. Asymptotically,
lim￿!1 ￿ m￿ = [1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)]U ￿ ￿ ￿ a ￿ b:
2.3 Comparative Statics
This section explores how separation behavior varies with worker and ￿rm quality. There
are several equivalent characterizations. We begin with a proposition that characterizes how
the reservation value of beliefs about match quality varies with worker and ￿rm quality. The
Proof is in Appendix A.
Proposition 5 At each tenure ￿ > 0, the reservation value of beliefs about match quality is







This result is fairly intuitive. Consider the changing the ￿rm￿ s quality b. This has no
e⁄ect on the ￿rm￿ s outside option since V = 0 in equilibrium, and no e⁄ect on the value of
the worker￿ s outside option. Thus it only a⁄ects the value of remaining in the match, J￿+￿￿:
Increasing b raises the wage (via  ), and hence increases J￿. Likewise, it increases the net
value of output (q￿ ￿ w￿) and hence ￿￿. Thus an increase in b raises the value of remaining
in the match, and makes the worker and ￿rm less selective about the set of acceptable values
of match quality. Having found a ￿good￿employer, the worker is less picky about whether
13or not it is a ￿good￿match. Since all workers are highly productive at ￿good￿￿rms, the
￿rm is less picky about whether or not they are ￿good￿matches.
Similar intuition explains why an increase in a reduces the reservation value of beliefs
about match quality, with one complication: increasing a raises the worker￿ s productivity
not only in the current match, but in all matches. That is, the value of the worker￿ s outside
option is increasing in a (see Lemma 6 in Appendix A). Nevertheless, matching frictions
ensure that increasing a raises the value of continuing the match more than the value of
terminating it.7 From the ￿rm￿ s perspective, having found a ￿good￿employee, the ￿rm is
less picky about whether or not she is a ￿good￿match.
Proposition 5 has obvious implications for the relationship between job duration and
worker/￿rm quality. Expected job duration is decreasing in ￿ m￿: Equation (35) therefore im-
plies expected job duration is increasing in worker and ￿rm quality. More productive workers
experience longer average job duration than less productive ones, and more productive ￿rms
experience less turnover than less productive ones. This is consistent with stylized facts.
To this point, we have characterized the separation decision in terms of ￿ m￿. This is the
most natural characterization to analyze separation behavior within a worker-￿rm match,
since beliefs about match quality are the only quantity that varies over the course of the
match. Alternately, we can characterize the separation decision in terms of a reservation level
of worker quality, ￿ a, for given ￿rm quality and beliefs about match quality; or symmetrically,
in terms of a reservation level of ￿rm quality, ￿ b, for given values of a and m￿: These quantities
are more natural to ask whether matches are assortative. Like ￿ m￿; they are de￿ned by
equating the two arguments of the max operator in the value function (33). That is, ￿ a and
￿ b are implicitly de￿ned by:


















where the expectation in (36) is taken with respect to (￿ a;b;m￿;s2
￿), and the expectation in












These show that holding beliefs about match quality constant, matches between workers
and ￿rms are negatively assortative: more productive ￿rms are willing to match with less
productive workers, and vice versa. This result is consistent with other models where pro-
duction is additively separable in agents￿types, e.g. examples presented in Shimer and Smith
(2000) (a search example) and Shimer (2005) (an assignment example). Negative assortative
matching is also consistent with recent empirical evidence that ￿nds a negative correla-
tion between empirical person and ￿rm e⁄ects.9 The intuition is straightforward. Using
Sattinger￿ s (1975) de￿nition of comparative advantage, the production function (6) implies
7That is, using the result of Lemma 6 in Appendix A, it is easy to show that @J￿=@a > @U=@a:
8The algebra is omitted but available on request. The method of proof parallels that of Proposition 5.
9For instance, ACK ￿nd negative correlations in France and Washington State, Goux and Maurin (1999)
￿nd a negative correlation in France using di⁄erent data and methods, Gruetter and Lalive (2004) ￿nd a
similar result in Austrian data, as do Barth and Dale-Olsen (2003) in Norwegian data.
14low-ability workers have a comparative advantage in high-productivity ￿rms.10 Furthermore,
since high-productivity ￿rms have the largest opportunity cost of an un￿lled vacancy, they
prefer to match with low productivity workers than to leave the vacancy un￿lled. This is
a boon to low-ability workers. The potential bene￿t of matching with a high-productivity
￿rm is su¢ cient that they would rather wait than accept employment at a low-productivity
￿rm. Low-ability workers also have the lowest opportunity cost of unemployment, and hence
are most willing to wait for a match with a high-productivity ￿rm. The converse is true for
high-ability workers and low-productivity ￿rms.
2.4 Discussion
Before turning to empirics, it is useful to discuss various predictions that stem from the
matching model with regards to equilibrium wages, mobility, turnover, and ￿rm size. We
will look for the empirical counterparts to these when assessing the empirical speci￿cation.
The matching model predicts that wages are additively separable in person- and ￿rm-
speci￿c components: the person and ￿rm e⁄ects ￿ and  . We know from the empirical work
of AKM and others that this additively separable structure is consistent with wage data. In
the typical application, it explains over 90 percent of wage variation. Since the person and
￿rm e⁄ects are functions of the productivity parameters a and b; productivity di⁄erences
across workers and ￿rms are one source of equilibrium wage dispersion. These productivity
di⁄erences are observable by match participants, but not necessarily by the econometrician.
Equilibrium wages are also linear and additively separable in the posterior mean of beliefs
about match quality m￿. Dispersion in beliefs therefore introduces additional equilibrium
wage dispersion. Since the person and ￿rm e⁄ects do not vary within a worker-￿rm match,
all within-match wage variation is due to the evolution of beliefs about match quality. Fur-
thermore, since beliefs evolve according to Bayes￿rule, m￿ is a martingale. Thus the model
predicts that within a worker-￿rm match, wages are a martingale.11 This is the basis of the
test developed in Section 3.4.
The martingale property is common to most Bayesian learning models, e.g. Farber and
Gibbons (1996) and Gibbons et al. (2005). It has several economic consequences: it implies
wage shocks are permanent and diminish with tenure,12 and that the variance of wages
increases with tenure. The latter follows because the variance of m￿ increases with the
number of observed signals: V￿+1 > V￿: This may seem at odds with the notion that beliefs
about match quality become increasingly precise with tenure. However, it is important to
10That is, for a0 > a abd b0 > b;
￿ + a0 + b0 + c + e￿
￿ + a0 + b + c + e￿
<
￿ + a + b0 + c + e￿
￿ + a + b + c + e￿
:
11Due to the selection process that terminates a match if m￿ < ￿ m￿; the wage sequence observed by an
econometrician is a submartingale.
12Recall the de￿nition of m￿ in equation (9). It implies shocks to beliefs about match quality (z and e￿)
are permanent. Within a match, these are the only shocks to wages. Thus wage shocks are permanent.
Recall further that m￿ is a precision-weighted average of m￿￿1 and the signal c + e￿: The precision of the
signals (shocks) is constant, but the precision of beliefs increases with tenure. Thus each successive signal
(shock) receives smaller weight in the updating process. Asymptotically, new signals receive zero weight.
15distinguish between the variance of beliefs, s2
￿; that declines with tenure, and the variance
of the posterior mean of beliefs, V￿, that increases with tenure.13 Since tenure and labor
marker experience are positively correlated empirically, this is consistent with the well known
empirical regularity that the variance of wages increases with experience (e.g., Mincer (1974)
and many others).
Section 2.3 presented comparative statics that characterize how separation behavior varies
with worker and ￿rm quality, a and b: The empirical exercise that follows focuses on esti-
mating the empirical person and ￿rm e⁄ects. We therefore seek predictions regarding the
relationship between separation behavior and ￿ and  : Applying Lemma 6 (see Appendix
A), it is a simple matter to show @￿=@a > 0 and @ =@b > 0: Combining this with (35), at







Because expected job duration is decreasing in ￿ m￿, the ￿rst inequality in (38) implies that
expected job duration is increasing in  . As we shall see in Section 5, this is consistent
with empirical evidence. A corollary is that turnover is decreasing in  . It follows that
ceteris paribus, ￿rm size (employment) is increasing in  . This is consistent with Brown
and Medo⁄ (1989) and others who ￿nd that conditional on observable worker and ￿rm
characteristics, large ￿rms pay higher wages than small ￿rms. A similar prediction arises
from the second inequality in (38): on average, workers with large person e⁄ects experience
longer job duration and change jobs less often than workers with small ￿. Lillard (1999)
￿nds a similar result in NLSY data.14
The negative assortative matching result of the previous section carries over to the per-
son and ￿rm e⁄ects. The model therefore predicts empirical estimates of ￿ and   will be
negatively correlated. This is consistent with most empirical studies based on the ￿xed e⁄ect
estimator, e.g., AKM, ACK, Barth and Dale-Olsen (2003), Goux and Maurin (1999), and
Gruetter and Lalive (2004).
The model also predicts that in a cross-section, workers with longer job tenure earn higher
wages on average than their counterparts with lower tenure. This is consistent with styl-
ized facts about labor markets and numerous empirical ￿ndings, e.g., Mincer and Jovanovic
(1981), Bartel and Borjas (1981), and many others.15 The argument is as follows. First,
larger values of ￿ and   are associated with higher wages and longer expected duration.
13The variance of beliefs s2
￿ declines because agents learn: as they acquire more information about true
match quality, their beliefs become increasingly precise. In contrast, the prior variance of the mean of beliefs
is zero: all agents have common priors about match quality. As information is acquired, the posterior mean
of beliefs converges to the true match quality. It follows that V￿ increases from its prior value (zero) to its
asymptotic value (￿2
c) as tenure increases.
14Lillard (1999) estimates simultaneous wage and turnover equations with random person and job e⁄ects.
His job e⁄ect is nested within the person e⁄ect and thus is not directly comparable to the ￿rm e⁄ects discussed
here. He ￿nds a negative correlation between the person e⁄ect in the wage equation and the person e⁄ect
in the job turnover hazard: higher values of the person-wage e⁄ect are associated with a reduced turnover
hazard.
15More recent research has focused on the causal link between job tenure and earnings growth using
longitudinal data. Examples include Abraham and Farber (1987), Altonji and Shakotko (1987), and Topel
and Ward (1992). Dostie (2005) is a recent study using longitudinal linked data. The matching model implies
that conditional on person and ￿rm e⁄ects, all returns to tenure are due to accumulated knowledge about
match quality. This accumulated knowledge is a form of match-speci￿c human capital. It is not ￿productive￿
16Second, conditional on ￿ and  ; better matches last longer and are associated with larger
values of m￿ on average, and hence with higher wages. Third, because the reservation level
of beliefs about match quality is monotone in tenure, the left tail of the wage distribution is
increasingly truncated as tenure increases. All three e⁄ects operate in concert to induce a
positive relationship between tenure and wages.
Finally, we have noted at several points that the additively separable structure of the
equilibrium wage function is the same as the AKM empirical speci￿cation. This speci￿cation
has been criticized for relying on an exogenous mobility assumption (discussed further in
Section 3). The matching model implies the AKM speci￿cation is consistent with endogenous
separations due to learning about match quality. However, it is important to note that wages
and separations are jointly determined. The posterior mean of beliefs about match quality
enters the equilibrium wage, but the optimal separation policy implies the employment
relationship only continues as long as m￿ ￿ ￿ m￿: Thus an econometrician observes a truncated
earnings distribution: earnings are only observed if w￿ ￿ ￿￿+￿+ +￿ ￿ m￿: Failing to correct
for truncation of the earnings distribution may bias empirical estimates of the person and
￿rm e⁄ects. I develop an appropriate correction in what follows.
3 Empirical Speci￿cation
At the core of the empirical speci￿cation is a linear wage equation like the AKM model.
The adopted speci￿cation explicitly accounts for truncation of the earnings distribution as
implied by the optimal separation policy. I also exploit the matching model￿ s structure to
test whether the conditional distribution of earnings is consistent with learning about match
quality.
Consider the following empirical counterpart to (30):
yijt = ￿ + x
0
it￿ + ￿i +  j + "ijt (39)
"ijt = ￿mij￿ + uijt (40)
where i = 1;:::;N indexes workers and j = 1;:::;J indexes ￿rms; yijt is the natural logarithm
of employment earnings; ￿ is the grand mean; xit is a vector of observable time-varying
covariates;16 ￿ is a parameter vector; ￿i is the person e⁄ect;  j is the ￿rm e⁄ect of the ￿rm j
at which worker i was employed in t (denoted j = J (i;t)); "ijt is a compound statistical error
that consists of the posterior mean of beliefs about match quality mij￿ times the worker￿ s
bargaining strength ￿; and classical measurement error uijt. I assume mij￿ is independent
of uijt: As in Section 2, ￿ indexes tenure. Equations (39) and (40) introduce an additional
index t of calendar time.17
human capital since productivity is constant over the duration of the match except for stochastic variation
induced by e￿. Nevertheless, it has value: it takes time to accumulate, and is lost when the match terminates.
16Covariates include year dummies, a quartic in experience (interacted with sex), and dummies for the
number of quarters worked in the year (also interacted with sex).
17The inclusion of time-varying covariates xit in (39) necessitates the additional calendar time index t:
Tenure and calendar time are in general related by a simple function. I therefore frequently suppress one of
these indices to economize on notation.
17Some comments are in order. First, notice that the dependent variable in (39) is log
earnings, while the equilibrium wage function is speci￿ed in levels. The semi-log speci￿cation
is a ￿rst-order approximation to a speci￿cation on levels.18 It is also, of course, the standard
speci￿cation for earnings regressions, and is adopted here for all the usual reasons.19 Second,
notice that (39) includes time-varying covariates xit; whereas the equilibrium wage function
(30) does not. The covariates admit variation over time in the theoretical mean of earnings
(￿￿), and variation in earnings due to labor force experience and attachment.20 Finally,
since beliefs about match quality are not observed by the econometrician, the posterior mean
mij￿ has been subsumed into the error term. Recall that match quality and its signals are
drawn independently of the person and ￿rm e⁄ects. However, the optimal separation policy
of workers and ￿rms introduces a selection process. Since worker-￿rm matches terminate
when mij￿ < ￿ mij￿; the observed distribution of earnings is truncated. Furthermore, since
@ ￿ mij￿=@￿i < 0 and @ ￿ mij￿=@ j < 0; the selection process induces a negative correlation
between mij￿ and the person and ￿rm e⁄ects. We therefore correct for incidental truncation,
as described in Section 3.3 below. The corrected error is uncorrelated with the person and
￿rm e⁄ects by construction.
We can further decompose the person e⁄ect ￿i into components observed and unobserved
by the econometrician as
￿i = ￿i + u
0
i￿ (41)
where ￿i is the unobserved component of the person e⁄ect; ui is a vector of time-invariant
person characteristics observed by the econometrician; and ￿ is a parameter vector.
Let N￿ denote the total number of observations; q the number of time-varying covariates
including the constant term; and p the number of time-invariant person characteristics.
Rewriting (39) and (41) in matrix notation, we have
y = X￿ + U￿ + D￿ + F  + " (42)
where y is the N￿ ￿ 1 vector of earnings outcomes, X is the N￿ ￿ q matrix of time-varying
covariates including the intercept; ￿ is a q ￿ 1 parameter vector; U is the N￿ ￿ p matrix of
time-invariant person characteristics; ￿ is a p￿1 parameter vector; D is the N￿ ￿N design







































where the ￿rst line uses the ￿rst-order Taylor series approximation ln(1 + x) ￿ x around x = 0; and where
￿￿ = ln￿; ￿
￿ = ￿=￿; ￿
￿
i = ￿=￿,  
￿
j =  =￿; and "￿
ijt = "ijt=￿:
19Complete estimation results on earnings levels are available on request. The regressions on levels show
some evidence of mis-speci￿cation, which was the primary reason for adopting the semi-log alternative.
20As noted in footnote 6, a more general model that includes deterministic human capital accumulation
and publicly-observable stochastic aggregate productivity shocks yields an equilbrium wage that is additively
separable in ￿;  ; m￿; an experience e⁄ect, and time e⁄ects, like (39).
18matrix of the unobserved component of the person e⁄ect; ￿ is the N ￿ 1 vector of person
e⁄ects; F is the N￿￿J design matrix of the ￿rm e⁄ects;   is the J ￿1 vector of ￿rm e⁄ects;
and " is the N￿ ￿ 1 vector of errors.
I consider two estimators of the parameters in (42). The ￿rst is the direct least squares
estimator of ACK, that treats ￿;￿;￿; and   as ￿xed. The second is a mixed e⁄ects estimator
that treats ￿ and ￿ as ￿xed, and ￿ and   as random. Abowd and Kramarz (1999) brie￿ y
discuss a similar mixed e⁄ects speci￿cation, but do not estimate it.21 The mixed e⁄ects
estimator has some compelling properties. First, as shown in Section 3.2.2, the least squares
estimator is a special case of the mixed e⁄ects estimator. Second, the theoretical person and
￿rm e⁄ects are random variables, which argues in favor of treating their empirical counter-
parts similarly.22 Third, with a large number of person and ￿rm e⁄ects to estimate, the ￿xed
e⁄ects estimator is costly in terms of degrees of freedom. The mixed model is less demanding
in this regard, since it only requires estimation of a few parameters of the distribution of the
random e⁄ects. Their realized values, i.e., the Best Linear Unbiased Predictors (BLUPs), are
estimated in a subsequent step. Fourth, as Robinson (1991) demonstrates, BLUPs typically
have better sampling properties than ￿xed e⁄ect estimates of the unobserved heterogeneity.
Fifth, the mixed e⁄ects estimator permits simultaneous maximum likelihood estimation of
the error covariance within a worker-￿rm match, which I use to test the learning hypoth-
esis described in Section 3.4. Finally, the mixed e⁄ects speci￿cation permits out-of-sample
prediction of person and ￿rm e⁄ects, which I use to validate the speci￿cation.
3.1 The Fixed Model
The ￿xed model is completely speci￿ed by (42) and the stochastic assumptions:





where IN￿ is the identity matrix of order N￿: Equation (43) is the exogenous mobility as-
sumption for which the AKM speci￿cation has been criticized. The least squares estimator
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In the data described in Section 4, the cross product matrix on the left hand side of (45)
is of su¢ ciently high dimension to preclude estimation using standard software. I therefore
compute least squares solutions ^ ￿; ^ ￿; ^ ￿; and ^   using the iterative conjugate gradient method
of ACK to directly minimize the sum of squared residuals. Their algorithm exploits the
sparse structure of the cross product matrix after blocking on connected groups of workers
21To my knowledge, the application herein is the ￿rst to estimate random person and ￿rm e⁄ects.
22When unobservables are random variables drawn from a homogeneous population distribution, statisti-
cians argue in favor of the mixed e⁄ects estimator. See Robinson (1991) or Searle et al. (1992) for such an
argument.
19and ￿rms.23 The resulting estimates of ￿ and   are not unique, since the design matrices
D and F are not full rank. ACK discuss identi￿cation of the person and ￿rm e⁄ects in
detail. I apply their grouping procedure to obtain unique estimates of ￿ and   subject to
the restriction that their overall and group means are zero. When there are G connected
groups of workers and ￿rms, this procedure identi￿es an overall constant term, and a set of
N +J ￿G￿1 person and ￿rm e⁄ects measured as deviations from the overall constant and
group-speci￿c means.
3.2 The Mixed Model
The mixed model speci￿cation treats ￿ and ￿ as ￿xed, and ￿ and   as random. The model




























It is worth noting that (42) and (46) do not assume that the design of the random e⁄ects
(D and F) is orthogonal to the design (X and U) of the ￿xed e⁄ects (￿ and ￿). Such an
assumption is usually violated in economic data.
I estimate two alternate parameterizations of the error covariance R:24 The simplest as-
sumes spherical errors, i.e., R = ￿2
"IN￿: I estimate this speci￿cation primarily for comparison
with the ￿xed model. The second parameterization puts no restrictions on the within-match
error covariance other than symmetry and positive semi-de￿niteness. Let M denote the
number of worker-￿rm matches in the data, and let ￿ ￿ denote the maximum observed dura-
tion of a worker-￿rm match. Suppose the data are ordered by t within j within i: In the
balanced data case, where there are ￿ ￿ observations on each worker-￿rm match, we can write
the second parameterization as
R = IM ￿ W (47)
where W is the ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ within-match error covariance.
The extension to unbalanced data, where each match between worker i and ￿rm j has
duration ￿ij ￿ ￿ ￿, is straightforward. De￿ne a ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ij selection matrix Sij with elements
on the principal diagonal equal to 1, and o⁄-diagonal elements equal to zero.25 Sij selects
those rows and columns of W that correspond to observed earnings outcomes in the match
between worker i and ￿rm j: We can generalize equation (47) to the unbalanced data case
by pre- and post-multiplying W by Sij: That is, R remains block-diagonal, but the diagonal
23See Searle (1987) for a statistical discussion of connectedness. In labor market data, ￿rms are con-
nected by common employees; workers are connected by common employers. ACK present a graph-theoretic
algorithm to identify connected groups of workers and ￿rms.
24Estimates of a variety of ARMA error covariances are also available on request.









20block corresponding to the match between worker i and ￿rm j is now the ￿ij ￿￿ij submatrix
Wij = S0
ijWSij:
3.2.1 REML Estimation of the Mixed Model






and R by Restricted Maximum Likelihood
(REML).26 REML is frequently described as maximizing that part of likelihood that is
invariant to the ￿xed e⁄ects (i.e., ￿ and ￿). Formally, REML is maximum likelihood on
linear combinations of the dependent variable y; chosen so that the linear combinations do
not contain any of the ￿xed e⁄ects. The linear combinations k0y are chosen so that
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rank r ￿ q + p; there are N￿ ￿ r linearly independent vectors k0 satisfying (48). De￿ne
K0 = CMXU with rows k0 satisfying (48), and where K0 and C have full row rank N￿ ￿ r:
REML estimation is maximum likelihood on K0y: For y ￿ N (X￿ + U￿;V) it follows that
K
0y ￿ N (0;K
0VK) (51)
where V = DD0￿2
￿ + FF 0￿2
  + R is the covariance implied by (46).
The REML estimator has a number of attractive properties. REML estimates are in-
variant to the choice of C and are invariant to the value of the ￿xed e⁄ects (i.e., ￿ and
￿). Furthermore, since REML is based on the maximum likelihood principle, it inherits the
consistency, e¢ ciency, asymptotic normality, and invariance properties of ML.
I maximize the REML log-likelihood implied by (51) using the Average Information (AI)
algorithm of Gilmour et al. (1995).27 The AI algorithm is a variant of Fisher scoring that uses
a computationally convenient average of the expected and observed information matrices to
compute parameter updates during iterative maximization of the REML log-likelihood.
3.2.2 Estimating the Fixed E⁄ects and Realized Random E⁄ects
The REML estimator does not directly estimate the ￿xed e⁄ects ￿ and ￿. Henderson et al.
(1959) derived a system of equations that simultaneously yield the BLUE of ￿xed e⁄ects and
26REML is the estimator of choice in applied ￿elds where mixed model estimation is common, e.g., statis-
tical genetics, and among plant and animal breeders.
27The AI algorithm is implemented in the ASREML software package.
21the BLUP of random e⁄ects. These have become known as the mixed model equations or































































where ~ ￿;~ ￿; ~ ￿; and ~   denote solutions for the various e⁄ects. Standard practice, which I
apply here, is to solve (53) conditional on REML estimates of the variance components.
The BLUPs ~ ￿ and ~   have the following properties.28 They are best in the sense of
minimizing the mean square error of prediction among linear unbiased estimators. They are
linear in y; and unbiased in the sense E(~ ￿) = E (￿) and E(~  ) = E ( ):
The mixed model equations make clear the relationship between the ￿xed and mixed
models. In particular, as G ! 1 with R = ￿2
"IN￿, the mixed model equations (53) converge
to the normal equations (45). Thus the mixed model solutions (~ ￿;~ ￿; ~ ￿; ~  ) converge to the
least squares solutions (^ ￿;^ ￿; ^ ￿; ^  ): Thus the least squares estimator is a special case of the
mixed model estimator.
3.3 Correcting for Truncation of the Earnings Distribution
In the matching model, a match between worker and ￿rm terminates when the point estimate
of match quality m￿ falls below the reservation value ￿ m￿. This implies the distribution of
earnings is truncated. Earnings are only observed when m￿ ￿ ￿ m￿.
If we iterate forward on the de￿nition of ￿ m￿ in (34) we obtain
￿ m￿ = ￿[￿A￿ + B￿] ￿ [a ￿ U (1 ￿ ￿)]A￿ ￿ bA￿ (54)
where
A￿ = 1 +
1 X
s=1






















m￿+sdF￿+s ￿￿￿dF￿+2d ￿ F￿+1 (56)










: Reintroducing the person and
￿rm subscripts, I approximate (54) by
￿ mij￿ = ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿i￿ ￿ ￿j￿: (57)
28See Robinson (1991) for details.
22Recall mij￿ ￿ N (0;V￿): Under the approximation (57), the probability of observing earnings
at tenure ￿ is
Pr(mij￿ ￿ ￿ mij￿) = 1 ￿ ￿
￿













where ￿ is the standard normal CDF. The conditional expectation of observed earnings is
therefore
E [yijtjmij￿ ￿ ￿ mij￿] = ￿ + x
0

















= ￿ + x
0
it￿ + ￿i +  j + ￿V
1=2
￿ ￿ij￿ (59)
where ￿ij￿ is the familiar Inverse Mills￿Ratio.
I perform a two-step truncation correction based on (58) and (59). I estimate a contin-
uation probit at each tenure level with random person- and ￿rm-speci￿c mobility e⁄ects.29
The probits are estimated by Average Information REML applied to the method of Schall
(1991).30 With estimates of the realized random e⁄ects ~ ￿it and ~ ￿j￿ in hand, I construct
an estimate ~ ￿ij￿ of the Inverse Mills￿Ratio and include it as an additional covariate in the
earnings equation. Note the bargaining strength parameter ￿ is not identi￿ed.
3.4 The Learning Hypothesis
I now turn to a testable hypothesis of the matching model. In the theoretical model, agents
update their beliefs about match quality using Bayes￿Rule. Bayesian learning implies a
speci￿c structure for the within-match error covariance W: Speci￿cally, given the compound
error structure "ijt = ￿mij￿ + uijt; we have W = ￿2V + ￿2
uI￿ ￿; where V is the ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ within-
match covariance of the vector of belief terms [mij1 ￿￿￿ mij￿ ￿]; and ￿2
u is the variance of
measurement error.31 Learning about match quality therefore implies
W =
2
6 6 6 6 6
4
￿2V1 + ￿2
u ￿2V1 ￿2V1 ￿￿￿ ￿2V1
￿2V1 ￿2V2 + ￿2
u ￿2V2 ￿￿￿ ￿2V2
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(60)
where V￿ was de￿ned in (13).
Some aspects of (60) are worthy of note. First, o⁄-diagonal elements within each column
of the lower triangle are equal. This is a property of the covariance of any martingale
process, and is quite intuitive. Elements of column ￿ are Cov (mij￿;mij￿0): In the lower
triangle, ￿ ￿ ￿0: The common elements in mij￿ and mij￿0 are the signals of match quality
29Identi￿cation of the random e⁄ects required pooling of some probit equations across tenure levels.
30Schall (1991) extends standard estimation methods for generalized linear models to the random e⁄ects
case. It is based on REML estimation of a linearized link function (in this case, ￿):




, and Wij = ￿2S0
ijV Sij+￿2
uI￿ij:
23received up to tenure ￿: Thus the covariance between mij￿ and mij￿0 is the variance of the
signals received up to tenure ￿, i.e., V￿: A second aspect of note is that the diagonal elements
of W are greater than o⁄-diagonal elements in the same column due to measurement error.
Finally, as discussed in Section 2.4, V￿+1 > V￿:32 Consequently in the lower triangle of (60),
elements in each row increase in magnitude from left to right.




e enter into each V￿; they can be recovered from an estimate of the
within-match error covariance (up to the factor of proportionality ￿2). I test the learning
hypothesis and recover the structural parameters and ￿2
u in two steps. The ￿rst step is to
estimate W: For the mixed model, I use the unrestricted REML estimate of the within-
match error covariance.33 For the ￿xed model, I use the within-match sample covariance of
the residuals.34 Following Abowd and Card (1989) and Farber and Gibbons (1996), in the
second step I ￿t the martingale covariance ￿2V + ￿2
uI￿ ￿ to the estimate of W by minimum
distance.35 This yields estimates of the structural parameters up to ￿2: I test the learning
hypothesis with the usual ￿2 test of overidentifying restrictions, using the test statistic of
Newey (1985).36
4 Data
Identifying the person and ￿rm e⁄ects requires repeated observations on both workers and
￿rms: longitudinal linked data on employers and employees. I use data from the US Cen-
sus Bureau￿ s Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) program database. The
LEHD database spans thirty-two states that represent the majority of American employ-
ment. In this paper, I use data from two participating states. Their identity is con￿dential.
The LEHD data are administrative, constructed from quarterly Unemployment Insurance
(UI) system wage reports. Every state, through its Employment Security agency, collects
quarterly earnings and employment information to manage its unemployment compensation
program. The characteristics of the UI wage data vary slightly from state to state. However
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (1997, p. 42) claims that UI coverage is ￿broad and basically
comparable from state to state￿and that ￿over 96 percent of total wage and salary civilian
jobs￿were covered in 1994. Further details regarding UI wage records and the LEHD data
can be found in Stevens (2002), Abowd et al. (2000), and LEHD Program (2002). With the
UI wage records as its frame, the LEHD data comprise the universe of employers required to
32The prior variance of mij￿ is zero: all agents have common priors about match quality. As agents acquire
information, the posterior mean of beliefs converges to true match quality. V￿ increases from its prior value
(zero) to its asymptotic value (￿2
c) as tenure increases.
33The relevant block of the REML Average Information matrix estimates the covariance of W:
34In this speci￿cation, I estimate the covariance of W using the fourth moments of the residuals.
35Optimal minimum distance estimation, as discussed in Hansen (1982) and Chamberlain (1984), proved
infeasible. For all speci￿cations, the estimated covariance of W was poorly conditioned, and did not invert.
I use a diagonal weight matrix instead, with elements equal to the natural logarithm of the number of obser-
vations contributing to each element of W: The data are highly unbalanced, with many more observations
contributing to elements in the upper-left corner of W than to elements of the lower-right corner. This weight
matrix gives greater weight to more precisely estimated elements of W: Weighting by a diagonal matrix of
variances yields similar results, as does equally weighted minimum distance.
36The Newey (1985) test statistic does not require inverting the variance of the moment conditions.
24￿le UI system wage reports ￿ that is, all employment potentially covered by the UI system
in participating states.
Individuals are uniquely identi￿ed in the data by a Protected Identity Key (PIK). Em-
ployers are identi￿ed by an unemployment insurance account number (SEIN). The UI wage
records themselves contain only very limited information: PIK, SEIN, and earnings. Earn-
ings are a measure of total compensation that includes gross wages and salary, bonuses, stock
options, tips and gratuities, and the value of meals and lodging when these are supplied (Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics (1997, p. 44)). The LEHD database integrates the UI wage records
with internal Census Bureau data to obtain additional demographic and ￿rm characteristics,
including sex, race, date of birth, industry, and geography.
Though the underlying data are quarterly, they are aggregated to the annual level for
estimation. The full sample consists of over 49 million annualized employment records on
full-time workers between 25 and 65 years of age who are employed at nearly 575,000 private-
sector non-agricultural ￿rms between 1990 and 1999.
Missing data items are multiply-imputed. Three imputed values are generated for each
missing data item. The result is three versions of each of the samples, that I call completed
data implicates, each of which contains a di⁄erent set of imputed values. Further details on
sample construction, variable creation, and missing data imputation are given in the Data
Appendix.
The direct least squares estimator of ACK is very computationally e¢ cient. It is therefore
possible to estimate the ￿xed model on the full sample. Computational demands of the
mixed model, however, necessitate estimating it on a subsample of observations. Sampling
from these data is nontrivial because the sample must be su¢ ciently connected to precisely
estimate the person and ￿rm e⁄ects.37 I therefore draw a one percent subsample using the
dense sampling algorithm of Woodcock (2005). This sampling procedure ensures that each
worker is connected to at least ￿ve others by a common employer, but is otherwise equivalent
to a simple random sample of individuals employed in a reference year (1997). That is, all
individuals employed in 1997 have an equal probability of being sampled. A second (disjoint)
one percent dense random subsample is drawn for model validation. In what follows, the
subsamples are labeled Dense Sample 1 and Dense Sample 2, respectively. More details
on the dense sampling algorithm can be found in the Data Appendix. All mixed model
estimates are computed on Dense Sample 1. Tables 1 and 2 report characteristics of the
samples. These are discussed further in the Data Appendix.
Estimating the within-match error covariance W requires a measure of job tenure. All
employment spells active in the ￿rst quarter for which data are available are presumed left-
censored. Since job tenure is unknown for left-censored spells, they are excluded from the
samples for the purpose of estimating W, and hence for testing the learning hypothesis.38
Those estimates that do not require a measure of job tenure are based on samples that
include the left-censored spells.
37Identifying the e⁄ects requires multiple observations on employees of most ￿rms and mobility of workers
across ￿rms. A small simple random sample of individuals, for example, is usually not su¢ ciently connected
to estimate the person and ￿rm e⁄ects precisely.
38Alternate results based on multiply-imputed tenure for the left-censored spells are available on request.
255 Results
The ￿xed and mixed models described in Section 3 are estimated on each of the completed
data implicates. Statistics reported in this section combine those obtained on the three
implicates using standard formulae in Rubin (1987). Estimates of the ￿xed covariate e⁄ects
￿ and ￿ are available from the author upon request. There is little variation in the estimated
covariate e⁄ects across speci￿cations. Their values are reasonable.
5.1 Parameter Estimates and Model Fit
Tables 3 and 4 present estimates of the variance components and a summary of model ￿t for
the three speci￿cations of interest: the ￿xed model, the mixed model with spherical errors
(R = ￿2
"IN￿), and the mixed model with unrestricted within-match error covariance W: The
estimates reported in Table 3 include left-censored spells,39 while those in Table 4 exclude
them. The two sets of estimates are virtually identical. Both tables report mixed model
estimates with and without the truncation correction.40
The estimated variance components have a straightforward interpretation. Conditional
on all other e⁄ects, a one standard deviation increase in the value of the person e⁄ect increases
real annualized earnings by ￿￿ log points. Similarly, a one standard deviation increase in
the value of the ￿rm e⁄ect increases real annualized earnings by ￿  log points.
The ￿rst thing to note in Tables 3 and 4 is that the truncation correction induces virtually
no change in the estimated variance components. This is not overly surprising given the small
point estimates of ￿￿ (between zero and 0.04, depending on speci￿cation). It is quite common
to ￿nd small selection/truncation biases in earnings data.
The second item of note is that in all speci￿cations, the variance of the person e⁄ect
(￿2
￿) is considerably larger than the variance of the ￿rm e⁄ect (￿2
 ). That is, individual
heterogeneity generates more earnings dispersion than ￿rm heterogeneity. This is consistent
with the ￿ndings of AKM and others. In Tables 3 and 4, the ￿xed model yields the largest
estimate of ￿2
￿ (0.29), but among the smallest estimates of ￿2
  (0.08). These values are
comparable to those estimated by ACK for France and the State of Washington, though
smaller than Abowd et al. (2003) ￿nd in a broader sample of seven LEHD states.41 The
mixed model with spherical errors yields a slightly smaller estimate of ￿2
￿ (about 0.23), and
an estimate of ￿2
  almost twice that obtained in the ￿xed model. Relaxing the spherical errors
assumption in favor of the unrestricted within-match error covariance reduces the estimate
of ￿2
  to a level comparable to the ￿xed model, and reduces the estimate of ￿2
￿ to 0.18. For
this speci￿cation, a one standard deviation increase in the value of the person e⁄ect increases
earnings by 0.42 log points, and a one standard deviation increase in the value of the ￿rm
39Table 3 estimates of the mixed model with W unrestricted are based on multiply-imputed tenure for
left-censored spells.
40Complete estimation results for the probit equations are available on request. I have not applied the
truncation correction to the ￿xed model. Doing so is technically possible though computationally demanding:
it requires estimating about 25 million probit person and ￿rm e⁄ects.
41The ACK estimates for Washington State are ￿2
￿ = 0:21 and ￿2
  = 0:09: For France they estimate
￿2
￿ = 0:23 and ￿2
  = 0:05: Abowd et al. (2003) estimate ￿2
￿ = 0:64 and ￿2
  = 0:13: The discrepancy is at
least partly due to di⁄erent identifying assumptions for state means.
26e⁄ect increases earnings by 0.28 log points. Clearly, unobserved individual heterogeneity
contributes more to earnings variation than unobserved ￿rm heterogeneity. However both
are very economically signi￿cant.
Tables 3 and 4 also report some measures of model ￿t. The mixed model with spherical
errors obtains the best ￿t by in-sample measures (AIC, BIC), largely due to its parsimony.
To obtain a measure of out-of-sample ￿t for the mixed models, I solve the mixed model
equations (53) on Dense Sample 2, using the variance components ~ G and error covariance
~ R estimated on Dense Sample 1. I compute the prediction error for each observation, and
report its variance.42 By this measure too, the mixed model with spherical errors obtains
the best ￿t.
It is standard to test random e⁄ects speci￿cations against the ￿xed e⁄ects alternative
using the Hausman (1978) test. Unfortunately, in these data the test proved inconclusive
for both mixed e⁄ects speci￿cations: the test statistics were negative.
Table 5 presents correlations among the estimated e⁄ects. They are qualitatively similar
across speci￿cations. Of the estimated e⁄ects, the person e⁄ect ￿i is most highly correlated
with log earnings: between 0.74 and 0.82, depending on speci￿cation. In each case, the
portion of ￿i corresponding to unobserved heterogeneity (￿i) is much more highly correlated
with earnings than the observable component (ui￿): This is at least partly due to the rel-
atively limited set of observable characteristics in the LEHD data.43 Correlations between
the ￿rm e⁄ect and log earnings are lower: between 0.45 and 0.54. Time-varying covariates
are even less correlated with earnings, between 0.18 and 0.3 depending on speci￿cation.
Recall that the matching model predicts a negative correlation between ￿i and  j: In the
￿xed model and the mixed model with spherical errors, the correlation between ￿i and  j is
essentially zero (0.03). ACK obtain a similarly small, though negative (-0.02), correlation in
Washington State data. Abowd et al. (2003), using a sample of seven states from the LEHD
data, estimate the correlation to be 0.08. Thus estimates in the ￿rst two panels of Table 5
are consistent with other US evidence.44
Andrews et al. (2004b) argue that least squares estimates of the correlation between ￿i
and  j may be biased downward. I ￿nd some corroborating evidence in Table 5. When the
mixed model is relaxed to allow an unrestricted within-match error covariance, the correlation
between ￿i and  j increases signi￿cantly to 0.22. Interestingly, a the same result is obtained
with a variety of alternate speci￿cations of the within-match error covariance (not reported
here, but available on request), including a variety of ARMA structures or a random ￿match
e⁄ect.￿This suggests that the downward bias noted by Andrews et al. (2004b) may not be
a consequence of the ￿xed e⁄ects estimator per se, but due to mis-speci￿cation of the error
distribution. Further research is needed to clarify this issue.
The estimated correlation between ￿i and  j appears to contradict the theoretical model.
However Figure 1, which plots the estimated cubic regression of ￿i on  j for each of the
speci￿cations, suggests that focusing solely on correlations may be misleading. In each case,
42For models with R = ￿2
"IN￿; the prediction error associated with an observation is the estimated residual.
For the model with W unrestricted, the prediction error is the di⁄erence between the estimated residual and
its conditional expectation given the other within-match residuals under multivariate normality.
43Time-invariant covariates include education, race, and a dummy variable to indicate whether initial
potential experience is negative, all interacted with sex.
44In contrast, European studies typically ￿nd a substantial negative correlation.
27the relationship between person and ￿rm e⁄ects is highly nonlinear. There is a systematic,
though weak, positive association between the person and ￿rm e⁄ects in the neighborhood
of zero. Given the estimated correlations reported in Table 5, it is not surprising that
the positive association is strongest in the mixed model with W unrestricted. Among more
extreme values of the person and ￿rm e⁄ects, however, there is strong ￿mismatch￿of the type
predicted by the matching model.45 This result is common to all three empirical speci￿cations
and explains, in part, the near-zero correlations between person and ￿rm e⁄ects in Table 5.
The two bottom panels of Table 5 present correlations among the estimated e⁄ects after
correcting for truncation. The truncation correction has no noticeable e⁄ect on the corre-
lations between earnings, the person and ￿rm e⁄ects, and covariates. The correction term
itself (￿￿￿ij￿) exhibits correlations consistent with the matching model. In the context of the
theoretical model, ￿￿￿ij￿ estimates the expected value of m￿ given that it exceeds ￿ m￿: Since
E [m￿jm￿ > ￿ m￿] is increasing in ￿ m￿; and recalling the comparative static result (38), the
matching model predicts @￿￿￿ij￿=@￿ < 0 and @￿￿￿ij￿=@  < 0: This prediction is supported
by the data, since the estimated correlation between the correction term and the person and
￿rm e⁄ects is negative in both mixed model speci￿cations. As for the correlation between
￿￿￿ij￿ and earnings, the predicted sign is ambiguous. On the one hand, because ￿￿￿ij￿
estimates E [m￿jm￿ > ￿ m￿], larger values of the correction term will be associated with larger
values of m￿; and hence of earnings also. On the other hand, larger values of ￿￿￿ij￿ will
be associated with smaller values of ￿i and  j; and hence lower earnings. In both mixed
model speci￿cations, the estimated correlation between ￿￿￿ij￿ and y is negative, implying
the latter e⁄ect dominates.
5.2 Testing the Learning Hypothesis
Estimates of the within-match error covariance W are presented in Tables 6 and 7. Table
6 presents ￿xed model estimates based on the full sample (excluding left-censored spells).
They exhibit some of the properties of the martingale covariance structure given in (60): in
each column, the diagonal elements are larger than the o⁄-diagonal elements, and elements
increase in magnitude from left to right within each row. However, the martingale structure
also implies that o⁄-diagonal elements within a column should be equal. They are clearly
not. Moving from lower-order to higher-order autocovariances, the elements in Table 6
consistently decline in magnitude.
Table 7 presents mixed model estimates of W with and without correcting for truncation.
They are virtually identical. Casual inspection indicates the estimates are consistent with
the structure implied by the learning process: diagonal elements are larger than o⁄-diagonal
elements within a column and elements increase in magnitude from left to right within each
row. Compared to the ￿xed model, there is far less decay in the autocovariances. This is
45A scatter plot of the estimated person and ￿rm e⁄ects would be more illustrative of mismatch. However,
con￿dentiality concerns preclude presenting one here. Su¢ ce to say, the plotted regression functions are
representative of the distribution of the data. The axes are scaled to approximate the observed maximum
and minimum values of ￿i and  j. The majority of the data lie within the unit circle, where the association
between person and ￿rm e⁄ects is weakest. However, a substantial proportion of the data (>10% of obser-
vations) lie outside this region. Almost all such observations lie in the northwest and southeast quadrants
of Figure 1, which is consistent with mismatch.
28more in line with the martingale structure than estimates in Table 6.
Results of the formal test of the learning hypothesis are given in Table 8. I ￿t (13) and
(60) to the ￿xed and mixed model estimates of W by minimum distance. Table 8 presents the
estimated structural parameters and p-values from the chi-squared test of over-identifying
restrictions.46 Recall that the structural parameters ￿2
c; ￿2
z; and ￿2
e are only identi￿ed up to
a factor of proportionality: the square of the bargaining strength parameter ￿: Estimates in
Table 8 are presented on the scale of the data, i.e., for ￿ = 1:47
The ￿rst set of columns in Table 8 present results for the ￿xed model. The estimated
variance of measurement error (￿2
u) is 0.05, which is reasonable and slightly smaller than the
variance of the ￿rm e⁄ect. The estimated variance of match quality (￿2
c) is small (0.01) in
comparison to the variance of the person and ￿rm e⁄ects. In contrast, the variance of the
initial signal of match quality (￿2
z) is very large (0.97), implying this signal conveys little
information. The variance of production outcomes (￿2
e) is also large (0.07) in comparison
to the variance of match quality, which suggests agents learn little about match quality
from output realizations. This is con￿rmed in Figure 2, which plots the variance of beliefs
about match quality (s2
￿) at various tenure levels. It declines very slowly from its prior value
(￿2
c = 0:01) to around 0.004 over the course of ten years. Agents learn do not learn much
about match quality because there is little to learn. It is therefore no surprise that the
over-identifying restrictions implied by the matching model are rejected for the ￿xed e⁄ect
speci￿cation.
Results for the mixed model are quite di⁄erent. These are presented in the second set of
columns in Table 8. For the most part, results are very similar with and without correcting
for truncation. The estimated variance of measurement error is reasonable (0.04) and similar
to the ￿xed model estimate. The estimated variance of match quality is about 0.09, larger
than the variance of the ￿rm e⁄ect but only about half the variance of the person e⁄ect.
Unlike the ￿xed model, this estimate implies substantial wage dispersion due to match
quality: a one standard deviation increase in match quality increases earnings by 0.3 log
points. The variance of the initial signal is 0.10, and production outcomes have a variance
of 0.15. Correcting for truncation reduces these estimates to 0.09 and 0.11, respectively.
These estimates imply learning about match quality is quite rapid. This is illustrated in
46Rubin (1987) provides formulae for combining chi-square distributed statistics estimated on multiply-
imputed data. Let dm denote the test statistic from the mth implicate, asymptotically distributed ￿2
k. Let
M denote the number of implicates, ￿ dm the sample mean of the statistics dm; and s2














^ v = (M ￿ 1)
￿




The quantity ^ rm is a method of moments estimator of the relative increase in variance of the test statistic





1 + ^ rm
(63)
has an asymptotic F distribution with k and
￿
1 + k￿1￿
^ v=2 degrees of freedom. Reported p-values are based
on ^ Dm:
47They can be re-scaled for any other 0 < ￿ < 1 quite easily: the re-scaled parameter is ￿2
￿ = ￿2=￿2:
29Figure 2. The initial signal resolves nearly half of the uncertainty about match quality: the
variance of beliefs drops from its prior value (0.09) to about 0.047. After observing one
production outcome, it falls further to 0.035. It falls to 0.02 by the ￿fth year, and to 0.01
by the tenth year. Thus most learning about match quality occurs early in the employment
relationship. As for the test of over-identifying restrictions, we reject the learning hypothesis
at the 5% level of signi￿cance but cannot do so at the 1% level. Given the large sample size,
it is perhaps surprising that we do not reject the null at all conventional signi￿cance levels.
Being unable to reject the learning hypothesis with a high degree of con￿dence lends some
support to the learning hypothesis, though it is far from overwhelming.
5.3 Additional Predictions From the Matching Model
Figures 3 through 5 address two additional predictions of the matching model: that larger
values of ￿i and  j should on average be associated with longer job duration, and that
the ￿rm e⁄ect should be positively associated with ￿rm size. To address the ￿rst of these
predictions, I ￿t a fourth-order polynomial in completed job duration to the estimated person
and ￿rm e⁄ects.48 I focus on results for the mixed model with W unrestricted. Results from
the other speci￿cations are very similar and available on request. Figures 3 and 4 present the
￿tted curves. As predicted, larger values of ￿i and  j are associated with longer duration.
The pro￿le is much steeper for the person e⁄ect than for the ￿rm e⁄ect. This is consistent
with the much greater variation in ￿i than  j:
To address the second prediction, I ￿t a fourth-order polynomial in the natural logarithm
of the ￿rm￿ s 1997 employment to the estimated ￿rm e⁄ect.49 Again, I focus on the mixed
model with W unrestricted. Results obtained on the other speci￿cations and for employment
in other years are very similar. Figure 5 presents the ￿tted curves. As predicted by the
matching model, larger values of  j are associated with larger employment. The relationship
is nearly linear for small and medium-size ￿rms, and quite convex among the largest ￿rms.
6 Conclusion
The matching model presented in Section 2 predicts rich dispersion in equilibrium wages and
employment dynamics. Productivity di⁄erences across individuals, technological di⁄erences
between ￿rms, and learning about match quality all contribute. Given our assumptions
about the production technology and wage bargaining, the equilibrium wage function takes
the same additively-separable form as the AKM empirical speci￿cation. This provides a
formal economic interpretation of the AKM person and ￿rm e⁄ects. They re￿ ect productiv-
ity di⁄erences across workers and ￿rms, adjusted for bargaining strength and discounting.
Consistent with most previous empirical studies, the model predicts a negative correlation
between estimated person and ￿rm e⁄ects. The model also makes new predictions about the
48Left-censored spells are excluded. Alternate results based on multiply-imputed tenure for left-censored
spells are available on request. They are virtually identical.
491997 was chosen because the Economic Census was conducted in that year, and because the dense
samples use 1997 as a reference year.
30equilibrium relationship between the person and ￿rm e⁄ects and separation behavior, job
duration, and ￿rm size.
It is well known by now that person and ￿rm e⁄ect models explain (in a statistical sense)
the vast majority of wage dispersion. In the LEHD data considered here, our speci￿cation
of the equilibrium wage function explains about 90 percent of variation in earnings.50 The
empirical results suggests that productivity di⁄erences across individuals contribute about
twice as much to wage dispersion as do di⁄erences across ￿rms. The matching model and our
empirical speci￿cation attribute the remaining dispersion to learning about match quality
and measurement error. Estimates of the structural parameters imply learning about match
quality contributes about as much to wage dispersion as ￿rm-level heterogeneity does.
Formal and informal tests of the matching model￿ s empirical predictions yield somewhat
mixed results. On the one hand, correlations between the truncation correction term and
the person and ￿rm e⁄ects have the predicted sign. Likewise, the relationship between the
estimated person and ￿rm e⁄ects and job duration, and between the ￿rm e⁄ect and ￿rm size,
are as predicted. We are also unable to con￿dently reject the learning hypothesis. On the
other hand, the truncation correction has surprisingly little e⁄ect on estimates. Likewise, the
estimated correlation between the person and ￿rm e⁄ects has the wrong sign ￿though most
other studies, particularly those on European data, have found correlations in line with the
model￿ s predictions. Even in the LEHD data, close inspection of the distribution of person
and ￿rm e⁄ects reveals some evidence of mismatch between workers and ￿rms, as predicted
by the model. Overall, the data provide considerable, though not overwhelming, support for
the model.
This paper identi￿es several fruitful avenues for future research. Investigating the impor-
tance of explicit human capital investments, and of the ￿rm￿ s choice of technology, would
be considerable contributions. There is also room to consider alternate forms of endogenous
mobility, such as on-the-job search. On the empirical front, we found evidence of biases
arising from mis-specifying the error distribution. This deserves further investigation.
50R2 in the ￿xed model is 0.87. There is no exactly comparable measure of variation explained by the
mixed models. An approximate measure is given by R2 in the auxiliary regression of the estimated person,
￿rm, and covariate e⁄ects on log earnings. Using this measure, R2 for the mixed model with spherical errors
is 0.91, and R2 = 0:88 for the mixed model with W unrestricted.
31A Appendicized Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2. De￿ne the operator T by
(TW)(m￿) = max
￿











￿) denotes the normal distribution with mean m￿ and variance v￿+1
de￿ned in equations (14) and (15), and where the second state variable s2
￿ has been suppressed
to simplify the notation. Let S denote the space of bounded, continuous, nondecreasing,
convex functions. We ￿rst show T : S ! S: Let q (m￿) = ￿ + a + b + m￿: The boundedness
assumption implies q (m￿) is bounded, and it is obviously continuous, increasing, and convex.









maps S into itself. So let W 2 S: Then MW is bounded and continuous. To see that it
is nondecreasing, let m0
￿ > m￿: Then F (m￿+1jm0
￿;￿2) ￿ F (m￿+1jm￿;￿2) for every ￿2 > 0:
That is, F (m￿+1jm0


















since W is nondecreasing by hypothesis. As for convexity, since m￿+1 ￿ N (m￿;v￿+1) we can


















￿) is the normal distribution with mean zero and variance v￿+1: Then for any
m￿;m0
￿; and ￿ 2 [0;1];


















































= (MW)(￿m￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)m
0
￿)
where the inequality follows because W is convex. Thus M : S ! S and hence T : S ! S
also.
32To show there is a unique W 2 S that satis￿es the Bellman equation (33) we need only
establish that T is a contraction. Uniqueness then follows immediately from the Contraction
Mapping Theorem, since S and the sup norm de￿ne a complete metric space. To show that
T is a contraction, we verify the Blackwell (1965) su¢ cient conditions.
Monotonicity: Let ￿;W 2 S and ￿(x) ￿ W (x) for all x: Then
(T￿)(m￿) = max
￿
























Discounting: Let W 2 S; y ￿ 0; and ￿ 2 (0;1): Then
[T (W + y)](m￿) = max
￿
q (m￿) + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
Z

































= (TW)(m￿) + ￿y
as required.
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof of Proposition 2 showed that when W is contin-








￿). Therefore the ￿rst
argument of the max operator in the Bellman equation (33) is continuous and increasing in
m￿: The second argument is a constant, and the result follows immediately.





























is increasing in s2
￿: We already know from the proof of Proposition 2 that % is nondecreasing
in m￿: Recall that F (m￿+1jm￿;s2
￿) is the normal distribution with mean m￿ and variance
















so an increase in s2
￿ constitutes a mean-preserving spread on m￿+1: Since W is convex in its












































As for the main result, suppose to the contrary that ￿ m￿+1 < ￿ m￿: Then from (34),































The right-hand side is negative because % is nondecreasing in its ￿rst argument and ￿ m￿+1 <
￿ m￿ by hypothesis, and because % is increasing in its second argument and s2
￿+1 < s2
￿ for all
￿ > 0: But the left-hand side is negative, a contradiction.
The following lemmata are useful for the proof of Proposition 5.






Proof. Write the value of the worker￿ s outside option as:










1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
(64)
where












is the prior expected value of employment de￿ned in (22) and F ￿
b is de￿ned Appendix B.
That @U=@b = 0 is obvious, since U doesn￿ t depend on b:












































@ (J1 ￿ U)
@a
dF1 (67)
where F￿+1 is shorthand for F (m￿+1jm￿;s2
￿) and ￿ J￿ is shorthand for the value of J￿ when
m￿ = ￿ m￿: Note ￿ J￿ = U by de￿nition of ￿ m￿ and the individual rationality property of the
Nash Bargain. Di⁄erentiating (20) gives the recursion
@ (J￿ ￿ U)
@a
= ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
@U
@a
+ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
Z 1
￿ m￿+1
@ (J￿+1 ￿ U)
@a
dF￿+1 (68)




















dF￿ ￿￿￿dF2dF1 > 0: (70)























because Z > 0 implies the term in square brackets is between zero and one, and ￿ 2 (0;1):
Lemma 7 The joint value of continuing the employment relationship, J￿ + ￿￿; is strictly
increasing in a and b:









and given lemma 6, it is su¢ cient to show the value function W is nondecreasing in a and
b: Recall the space of functions S from the proof of Proposition 2, and de￿ne the space of
functions S0 ￿ S that are also nondecreasing in a and b: Recall also the operators T and M
de￿ned in the proof of Proposition 2. Write the value function as W (m￿;a;b). If W 2 S0;






















which shows that M : S0 ! S0: Applying lemma 6 again, it follows that (TW)(m￿;a0;b0) ￿
(TW)(m￿;a;b) also. Hence T : S0 ! S0: Since S0 is a closed subset of S; the unique ￿xed
point of T is W 2 S0:
Proof of Proposition 5. Rewrite the threshold value of beliefs as
￿ m￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)U ￿ ￿ ￿ a ￿ b ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
Z 1
￿ m￿+1
(J￿+1 + ￿￿+1 ￿ U)d ￿ F￿+1 (72)
where ￿ F￿+1 = F (m￿+1j￿ m￿;s2
￿): Let x 2 fa;bg: Di⁄erentiating (72) using Leibniz￿ s Rule,
@ ￿ m￿
@x
= (1 ￿ ￿)
@U
@x
￿ 1 + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
@ ￿ m￿+1
@x

















(J￿+1 + ￿￿+1 ￿ U)
￿
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@x d ￿ F￿+1
1 + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
R 1








35where ￿ J￿+1 is shorthand for the value of J￿+1 when m￿+1 = ￿ m￿+1; ￿ ￿￿+1 is de￿ned analogously,
and ￿ J￿+1 + ￿ ￿￿+1 = U by de￿nition of ￿ m￿+1:








@b d ￿ F￿+1
1 + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
R 1








Since @ (J￿+1 + ￿￿+1)=@b > 0 by Lemma 7, the numerator is negative. The denominator is
positive because J￿+1+￿￿+1 ￿ U for m￿+1 ￿ ￿ m￿+1 (with equality only when m￿+1 = ￿ m￿+1);
and m￿+1 ￿ ￿ m￿+1 ￿ ￿ m￿ by Proposition 4. Thus @ ￿ m￿=@b < 0:
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@a d ￿ F￿+1
1 + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
R 1








As in (74), the denominator is positive. To sign the numerator note that for all s ￿ 1;
J￿+s + ￿￿+s ￿ U = ￿ + a + b + m￿+s ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)U
+￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
Z 1
￿ m￿+s+1
(J￿+s+1 + ￿￿+s+1 ￿ U)dF￿+s+1 (76)
and di⁄erentiating gives the recursion
@ (J￿+s + ￿￿+s ￿ U)
@a
= 1￿(1 ￿ ￿)
@U
@a
+￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
Z 1
￿ m￿+s+1









(1 ￿ ￿) @U
@a ￿ 1
￿ ￿ Z￿
1 + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
R 1









￿ Z￿ = 1 +
1 X
s=1









dF￿+s ￿￿￿dF￿+2d ￿ F￿+1 > 0: (79)
The numerator of (78) is negative, since @U=@a < 1
1￿￿ by lemma 6.
36B Appendix: The Steady State
B.1 Flows Into Unemployment
Let l(a;b;￿) denote the density of type a workers employed at type b ￿rms with tenure ￿.
The number of such workers entering unemployment in a given period is
(1 ￿ u)l(a;b;￿)[Pr(m￿ < ￿ m￿) + ￿]












where ￿ denotes the standard normal CDF. The ￿ ow into unemployment of all type a workers





































In the steady state, the probability ￿ that a vacancy is ￿lled is constant. Thus the equilibrium
number of vacancies opened by each ￿rm, i.e., the solution to (25), is also constant. Let ￿￿
b























when ￿ takes its steady state value and where F ￿
a is the steady state distribution of unem-
ployed worker types de￿ned below. Let fb denote the density function associated with the
distribution Fb of ￿rm types. The steady state number of vacancies opened by all type b
￿rms is ￿￿￿







B.3 Steady State Type Distributions
Each open vacancy is associated with a ￿rm type b: Let f￿
b (b) denote the steady state
distribution of ￿rm types among open vacancies. This is
f
￿





with corresponding CDF F ￿
b : Workers use F ￿
b to compute the expected value of employment
in new matches before the identity of the matching ￿rm is known.
37Similarly, we can de￿ne the distribution F ￿
a of unemployed worker types. Firms use F ￿
a
to compute the expected value of employment in new matches before the identity of the







Then the density function f￿
a associated with F ￿
a is f￿
a (a) = u￿1 [fa (a) ￿ (1 ￿ u)l(a)]; where
fa is the density function associated with the distribution Fa of worker types.
B.4 Flows Out of Unemployment
















b (b)dbda = m(u;v): (88)
The steady state ￿ ow-balance condition is the equality of (81) and (87) for all worker
types a and all ￿rm types b: This implies the aggregate steady state ￿ ow-balance (82) = (88):
The steady state level of unemployment is implicitly de￿ned by this equality when v takes















The sample is restricted to full-time private sector employees at their dominant employer,51
between 25 and 65 years of age, who had no more than 44 employers in the sample period,52
with real annualized earnings between $1,000 and $1,000,000 (1990 dollars), employed in
non-agricultural jobs that included at least one full quarter of employment.53 The resulting
sample consists of 174 million quarterly earnings observations on 9.3 million individuals
employed at approximately 575,000 ￿rms, for a total of over 15 million unique worker-￿rm
matches. The quarterly records are annualized for estimation, for a sample of 49.3 million
annual records.
C.1.1 The Dense Samples
The dense sampling algorithm of Woodcock (2005) ensures that individuals are connected to
a speci￿ed minimum number of other workers by means of a common employer. In brief, this
result is achieved by sampling ￿rms ￿rst, with probabilities proportional to employment in
a reference period. Workers are then sampled within ￿rms, with probabilities inversely pro-
portional to ￿rm employment. A minimum of n employees are sampled from each ￿rm. The
resulting sample is equivalent to a simple random sample of workers employed in the refer-
ence period (that is, each worker has an equal probability of being sampled), but guarantees
that each worker is connected to at least n others by a common employer.
I draw two disjoint one percent dense random samples of workers employed in 1997 using
this algorithm. Each worker is connected to at least n = 5 others.54 For comparison,
I also draw a one percent simple random sample of workers employed in 1997. Table 1
presents connectedness properties of the full sample, Dense Sample 1, and the simple random
sample.55 The full sample is highly connected: the largest connected group contains 99.06
percent of jobs. The dense sample remains quite highly connected: about 92 percent of jobs
are contained in the two largest connected groups. This is in contrast to the simple random
sample: though about 80 percent of jobs are contained in the two largest groups, only 84
percent are in groups containing at least 5 worker-￿rm matches. By construction, all jobs
in the dense samples are contained in groups of at least 5 matches. In the simple random
sample, fully 5.5 percent of jobs are connected to no other.
51A dominant employer is identi￿ed for each individual in each year. An individual￿ s dominant employer
in year t is the employer at which her reported UI earnings were largest in t. About 87 percent of the UI
system wage records correspond to employment at a dominant employer.
52There is some concern that observing an extreme number of employment spells may be due to measure-
ment error in the person and ￿rm identi￿ers. Around 0.5 percent of quarterly wage observations corresponded
to individuals employed at more than 44 employers over the sample period.
53An individual employed at SEIN j in quarter q is considered to have worked a full quarter if she was
employed at j in quarters q ￿ 1 and q + 1:
54The other parameters used to draw the dense samples, de￿ned in Woodcock (2005), are m = 0:5 and
p = 0:004:
55Characteristics of the two dense samples are virtually identical.
39C.2 Variable Creation and Missing Data Imputation
Time-varying covariates X include a quartic in labor force experience (interacted with sex),
four dummy variables to indicate the number of full quarters the individual worked in the
year (interacted with sex), and year e⁄ects. Time-invariant person characteristics U are
education (￿ve categories, interacted with sex), race (3 categories, interacted with sex), and
a dummy variable to indicate if the initial experience measure was negative (interacted with
sex).56
Missing data items include full-time status, education, tenure (for left-censored job
spells), initial experience, and (in some cases discussed below) the earnings measure. Missing
data items are multiply-imputed using the Sequential Regression Multivariate Imputation
(SRMI) method. See Rubin (1987) for a general treatment of multiple-imputation; the
SRMI technique is due to Raghunathan et al. (2001); Abowd and Woodcock (2001) general-
ize SRMI to the case of longitudinal linked data. SRMI imputes missing data in a sequential
and iterative fashion on a variable-by-variable basis. Each missing data item is multiply-
imputed with draws from the posterior predictive distribution of an appropriate generalized
linear model under a di⁄use prior. Full estimation results of each of the imputation regres-
sions are available on request. I generate three imputed values of each missing data item.
The result is three versions of the analysis sample, each containing di⁄erent imputed values
for the missing data items. In keeping with the statistical literature on multiple imputation,
I refer to these as completed data implicates.
C.2.1 Real Annualized Earnings
The dependent variable for the earnings regressions is log real annualized earnings. The
annualized measure is constructed from real full-quarter earnings. Full quarter earnings are
de￿ned as follows. For individuals who worked a full quarter at ￿rm j in t, full-quarter earn-
ings equal UI reported earnings (about 80 percent of the analysis sample). For individuals
who did not work a full quarter in t; one of two earnings measures is used. If the individual
worked at least one full quarter in the four previous or subsequent quarters, and if reported
earnings in quarter t were at least 80 percent of average real earnings in the full quarters,
the individual is presumed to have worked a full quarter.57 That is, reported earnings are
treated as full-quarter earnings (12.5 percent of the analysis sample). If on the other hand re-
ported earnings are less than 80 percent of average real average earnings in the full quarters,
earnings are imputed to the full-quarter level (7.5 percent of the analysis sample). The im-
putation model is a linear regression on log real full quarter earnings. Conditioning variables
include up to four leads and four lags of full quarter earnings (where available), year and
quarter dummies, race, education (5 categories), labor market experience (linear through
quartic terms), and SIC division. Separate imputation models were estimated for men and
for women. For each quarter in which earnings are imputed to the full-quarter level, three
imputed values are drawn from the posterior predictive distribution under a di⁄use prior.
After constructing the real full-quarter earnings measure, these are annualized to obtain real
56As described in Section C.2.3, initial experience is set to zero in this case.
57The 80 percent cuto⁄ was chosen as follows. For individuals that worked a full quarter in q; the median
ratio or quarter q earnings to average full-quarter earnigns in quarters q ￿ 4 to q + 4 was 0.8.
40annualized earnings.
C.2.2 Education
Education is multiply-imputed from the 1990 Decennial Census long form. The imputation
model is an ordered logit. There are 13 outcome categories, corresponding to 0 through
20 years of education. Conditioning variables include age (10 categories), vintiles of real
annual earnings at the dominant employer in 1990 or the year the individual ￿rst appeared
in the sample, and SIC division. Separate imputation models were estimated for men and
for women. For each person, three imputed values are drawn from the normal approxi-
mation (at the mode) to the posterior predictive distribution under a di⁄use prior. The
education measure is subsequently collapsed to ￿ve categories: Less than high school, High
school graduate, Some college or vocational training, Undergraduate degree, and Graduate
or professional degree.
C.2.3 Labor Market Experience
In the ￿rst quarter that an individual appears in the sample, I calculate potential labor
market experience (in years) as age at the beginning of the quarter minus years of education
minus 6. In cases where this measure is negative, potential experience is set to zero. In each
subsequent quarter, labor market experience is accumulated using the individual￿ s realized
labor market history. Note that since initial experience depends on the multiply-imputed
education measure, calculated labor market experience varies across the three completed
data implicates.
C.2.4 Tenure
Jobs fall into two categories with respect to the calculation of job tenure: spells that are
left-censored and spells that are not. In one state the data series begins in the ￿rst quarter
of 1990; in the other state, the data series begins earlier. All jobs with positive earnings
in the ￿rst quarter of available data for that state are presumed left censored. Such spells
comprise 33 percent of jobs in the full sample.
For non-left-censored spells, tenure is set to 1 in the ￿rst quarter that there is a UI wage
record, and is subsequently accumulated using the individual￿ s employment history. For left-
censored spells, tenure as of the ￿rst quarter of 1990 is imputed using data from the 1996 and
1998 CPS February supplements. The imputation model is a linear regression on the natural
logarithm of tenure. Conditioning variables include age (10 categories), vintiles of real annual
earnings at the dominant employer in 1990, education (5 categories), and SIC division. For
each left-censored job, three imputed values of tenure in 1990 quarter 1 were drawn from
the posterior predictive distribution under a di⁄use prior. In subsequent quarters, tenure is
accumulated using the individual￿ s employment history. Note that left-censored spells are
excluded from the reported estimates of W:
41C.2.5 Full-Time Status
Full-time status is multiply-imputed using the 1982-1999 CPS March supplements. The
imputation model is a binary logit. Conditioning variables include a quadratic in age, SIC
division, year dummies, and vintiles of reported annual earnings at the dominant employer.
Separate imputation models were estimated for men and for women. For each worker-￿rm
match in each year, three imputed values were drawn from the normal approximation (at
the mode) to the posterior predictive distribution under a di⁄use prior.
C.3 Characteristics of the Samples
Table 2 presents basic summary statistics for the full analysis sample, the two dense samples,
and a simple random sample. The dense samples exhibit properties virtually identical to
those of the simple random sample, con￿rming the analytic proof of equivalence in Woodcock
(2005). Since these are point-in-time samples, their properties di⁄er slightly from those of
the full sample. In particular, they exhibit properties consistent with a sample of individuals
with a somewhat stronger-than-average labor force attachment: individuals in the point-
in-time samples are somewhat more likely to be male, are slightly more educated, have
somewhat longer average job tenure, earn slightly more, and are somewhat more likely to
work a full calendar year. These are all small di⁄erences, however.
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Number of Groups 84,708 1,140 9,457
Number of Workers 9,271,766 49,425 49,200
Number of Firms 573,237 27,421 40,064
Number of Worker-Firm Matches 15,305,508 92,539 93,182
Number of Matches in Smallest Group 1 5 1
Percentage of Matches in:
Largest Group 99.06 67.25 59.37
Second Largest Group 0.0006 24.70 20.30
Third Largest Group 0.0003 0.04 0.06
Groups containing 5 or more matches 99.21 100 84.44
Groups containing only 1 match 0.35 0 5.50
a Results combined across three completed data implicates.
c One percent simple random sample of workers employed in 1997. Results are for one completed data implicate.
TABLE 1
PROPERTIES OF CONNECTED GROUPS OF WORKERS AND FIRMS








Male (Proportion) 0.56 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.57 0.50
Age (Years) 40.6 10.2 40.4 9.5 40.3 9.5
Men
Nonwhite (Proportion) 0.21 0.57 0.21 0.57 0.21 0.57
Race Missing (Proportion) 0.04 0.25 0.03 0.24 0.03 0.24
Less than high school (Proportion) 0.12 0.45 0.11 0.43 0.11 0.42
High school (Proportion) 0.30 0.67 0.29 0.66 0.30 0.66
Some college (Proportion) 0.23 0.60 0.23 0.60 0.23 0.59
Associate or Bachelor Degree (Proportion) 0.25 0.62 0.26 0.62 0.26 0.62
Graduate or Professional Degree (Proportion) 0.10 0.42 0.11 0.43 0.11 0.42
Women
Nonwhite (Proportion) 0.24 0.69 0.24 0.70 0.24 0.60
Race Missing (Proportion) 0.02 0.22 0.02 0.22 0.02 -0.01
Less than high school (Proportion) 0.09 0.45 0.09 0.43 0.09 0.28
High school (Proportion) 0.31 0.78 0.30 0.77 0.30 0.39
Some college (Proportion) 0.25 0.71 0.25 0.71 0.25 0.31
Associate or Bachelor Degree (Proportion) 0.26 0.72 0.28 0.75 0.27 0.42
Graduate or Professional Degree (Proportion) 0.08 0.42 0.09 0.44 0.09 0.31
Work History Characteristics
Tenure (Years) 4.5 3.5 4.9 3.6 4.8 3.6
Job is Left Censored (Proportion) 0.33 0.47 0.36 0.48 0.35 0.48
Real Annualized Earnings (1990 Dollars) 53755 50804 57209 51196 56483 50074
Men
Labor Market Experience (Years) 11.8 13.1 11.7 12.6 11.7 12.6
Initial Experience <0 (Proportion) 0.02 0.20 0.02 0.20 0.02 0.20
Worked 0 Full Quarters in Calendar Year (Proportion) 0.08 0.36 0.06 0.32 0.06 0.32
Worker 1 Full Quarter in Calendar Year (Proportion) 0.15 0.49 0.11 0.44 0.12 0.44
Worker 2 Full Quarters in Calendar Year (Proportion) 0.13 0.47 0.12 0.45 0.12 0.45
Worker 3 Full Quarters in Calendar Year (Proportion) 0.14 0.48 0.14 0.47 0.13 0.47
Worker 4 Full Quarters in Calendar Year (Proportion) 0.50 0.91 0.57 0.96 0.56 0.97
Women
Labor Market Experience (Years) 9.5 13.0 9.3 12.6 9.2 12.5
Initial Experience <0 (Proportion) 0.02 0.23 0.02 0.23 0.02 0.22
Worked 0 Full Quarters in Calendar Year (Proportion) 0.07 0.39 0.05 0.35 0.06 0.36
Worker 1 Full Quarter in Calendar Year (Proportion) 0.14 0.54 0.11 0.49 0.11 0.50
Worker 2 Full Quarters in Calendar Year (Proportion) 0.13 0.53 0.12 0.50 0.12 0.51
Worker 3 Full Quarters in Calendar Year (Proportion) 0.14 0.55 0.13 0.53 0.13 0.53
Worker 4 Full Quarters in Calendar Year (Proportion) 0.52 0.96 0.59 1.00 0.59 1.01
Number of Observations 49,281,533 357,725 357,009
Number of Workers 9,271,766 49,425 49,200
Number of Firms 573,237 27,421 40,064
Number of Worker-Firm Matches 15,305,508 92,539 93,182
a Means are computed on each completed data implicate for each sample. The reported value is the arithmetic mean of the means computed on each implicate.
b The variance of each variable is computed on each completed data implicate for each sample. The reported value is the square root of the arithmetic mean of the 
variances computed on each implicate.
Estimates Combined Across 3 Completed Data Implicates

















No Correction for Truncation
Variance of person effect (σ
2
α) 0.29 (0.002) 0.23 (0.005) 0.18 (0.002)
Variance of firm effect (σ
2
ψ) 0.08 (0.000) 0.15 (0.002) 0.08 (0.007)
Residual variance (σ
2
ε) 0.06 (0.000) 0.04 (0.001) n/a n/a
AIC
c -2.4 (0.000) -3.1 (0.016) -2.9 (0.009)
BIC
c 0.7 (0.001) -3.1 (0.016) -2.9 (0.009)
Var(out-of-sample prediction error)
c,d 0.036 (0.000) 0.038 (0.000)
Corrected for Truncation
Variance of person effect (σ
2
α) 0.23 (0.005) 0.18 (0.002)
Variance of firm effect (σ
2
ψ) 0.15 (0.002) 0.08 (0.006)
Residual variance (σ
2
ε) 0.04 (0.001) n/a n/a
Truncation Correction (βλ) 0.04 (0.002) 0.02 (0.001)
AIC
c -3.1 (0.016) -2.9 (0.006)
BIC
c -3.1 (0.016) -2.9 (0.006)
Var(out-of-sample prediction error)
c,d 0.036 (0.000) 0.038 (0.000)
Number of Observations 49,281,533 (9103) 357,725 (2363) 357,725 (2363)
Number of Workers 9,271,766 (710) 49,425 (150) 49,425 (150)
Number of Firms 573,237 (118) 27,421 (13) 27,421 (13)
Number of Worker-Firm Matches 15,305,508 (3196) 92,539 (470) 92,539 (470)
a   
Arithmetic mean of parameter estimate across three completed data implicates.
b   Square root of estimated total variance of parameter estimate across three completed data implicates, as defined in Rubin (1987).
c  Value in column labeled "Standard Error" is the square root of the estimated between-implicate variance.
d  Computed on Dense Sample 2.
e  Sample variance of estimated person and firm effects, averaged across three completed data implicates.
f   
Estimates based on multiply-imputed tenure for left-censored spells.
TABLE 3
ESTIMATED VARIANCE COMPONENTS AND SUMMARY OF MODEL FIT
Combined Results From 3 Completed Data Implicates
Fixed Model
Mixed Model With 
Spherical Error















No Correction for Truncation
Variance of person effect (σ
2
α) 0.29 (0.002) 0.24 (0.006) 0.18 (0.003)
Variance of firm effect (σ
2
ψ) 0.08 (0.000) 0.15 (0.003) 0.08 (0.001)
Residual variance (σ
2
ε) 0.07 (0.000) 0.05 (0.001) n/a n/a
AIC
c -2.0 (0.000) -3.0 (0.018) -2.8 (0.025)
BIC
c 4.0 (0.001) -3.0 (0.018) -2.8 (0.025)
Var(out-of-sample prediction error)
c,d 0.038 (0.000) 0.045 (0.000)
Corrected for Truncation
Variance of person effect (σ
2
α) 0.24 (0.005) 0.18 (0.003)
Variance of firm effect (σ
2
ψ) 0.15 (0.003) 0.08 (0.001)
Residual variance (σ
2
ε) 0.05 (0.001) n/a n/a
Truncation Correction (βλ) 0.00 (0.003) 0.02 (0.003)
AIC
c -3.0 (0.018) -2.8 (0.005)
BIC
c -3.0 (0.018) -2.8 (0.005)
Var(out-of-sample prediction error)
c,d 0.038 (0.000) 0.045 (0.000)
Number of Observations 32,800,936 (7217) 228,386 (2018) 228,386 (2018)
Number of Workers 12,289,989 (2855) 39,816 (168) 39,816 (168)
Number of Firms 544,254 (177) 24,624 (22) 24,624 (22)
Number of Worker-Firm Matches 7,577,051 (694) 73,307 (475) 73,307 (475)
a   
Arithmetic mean of parameter estimate across three completed data implicates.
b   Square root of estimated total variance of parameter estimate across three completed data implicates, as defined in Rubin (1987).
c  Value in column labeled "Standard Error" is the square root of the estimated between-implicate variance.
d  Computed on Dense Sample 2.
e  Sample variance of estimated person and firm effects, averaged across three completed data implicates.
TABLE 4
ESTIMATED VARIANCE COMPONENTS AND SUMMARY OF MODEL FIT
Combined Results From 3 Completed Data Implicates, Left-Censored Spells Excluded
Fixed Model
Mixed Model With 
Spherical Error
Mixed Model With 
Unrestricted Within-
Match Error CovarianceNo Correction for Truncation
Fixed Model y θα UηψXβ
Log Earnings (y) 1 0.74 0.66 0.34 0.45 0.18
Total Person Effect (θ) 0.74 1 0.91 0.41 0.03 -0.30
Unobserved Component (α) 0.66 0.91 1 0.00 0.00 -0.27
Observed Component (Uη) 0.34 0.41 0.00 1 0.09 -0.12
Total Firm Effect (ψ) 0.45 0.03 0.00 0.09 1 0.05
Time-Varying Covariates (Xβ) 0.18 -0.30 -0.27 -0.12 0.05 1
Mixed Model With Spherical Error y θα UηψXβ
Log Earnings (y) 1 0.80 0.71 0.38 0.47 0.29
Total Person Effect (θ) 0.80 1 0.91 0.41 0.03 0.02
Unobserved Component (α) 0.71 0.91 1 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03
Observed Component (Uη) 0.38 0.41 -0.01 1 0.08 0.11
Total Firm Effect (ψ) 0.47 0.03 -0.01 0.08 1 0.04
Time-Varying Covariates (Xβ) 0.29 0.02 -0.03 0.11 0.04 1
Mixed Model With Unrestricted Error Covariance
y θα UηψXβ
Log Earnings (y) 1 0.82 0.73 0.36 0.54 0.30
Total Person Effect (θ) 0.82 1 0.87 0.49 0.22 0.02
Unobserved Component (α) 0.73 0.87 1 -0.01 0.20 -0.03
Observed Component (Uη) 0.36 0.49 -0.01 1 0.09 0.09
Total Firm Effect (ψ) 0.54 0.22 0.20 0.09 1 0.041
Time-Varying Covariates (Xβ) 0.30 0.02 -0.03 0.09 0.04 1
Corrected For Truncation
Mixed Model With Spherical Error y θα UηψXββ λλ
Log Earnings (y) 1 0.80 0.71 0.38 0.48 0.29 -0.06
Total Person Effect (θ) 0.80 1 0.91 0.41 0.03 0.02 -0.01
Unobserved Component (α) 0.71 0.91 1 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.01
Observed Component (Uη) 0.38 0.41 -0.01 1 0.08 0.12 -0.02
Total Firm Effect (ψ) 0.48 0.03 0.00 0.08 1 0.05 -0.18
Time-Varying Covariates (Xβ) 0.29 0.02 -0.03 0.12 0.05 1 0.01
Truncation Correction (βλλ) -0.06 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.18 0.01 1
Mixed Model With Unrestricted Error Covariance
y θα UηψXββ λλ
Log Earnings (y) 1 0.82 0.73 0.36 0.54 0.30 -0.06
Total Person Effect (θ) 0.82 1 0.87 0.49 0.22 0.02 0.00
Unobserved Component (α) 0.73 0.87 1 -0.01 0.20 -0.03 0.00
Observed Component (Uη) 0.36 0.49 -0.01 1 0.09 0.09 -0.01
Total Firm Effect (ψ) 0.54 0.22 0.20 0.09 1 0.04 -0.25
Time-Varying Covariates (Xβ) 0.30 0.02 -0.03 0.09 0.04 1 0.00
Truncation Correction (βλλ) -0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.25 0.00 1
TABLE 5
CORRELATIONS AMONG ESTIMATED EFFECTS
Combined Results From 3 Completed Data ImplicatesTenure 123456789 1 0
1 0.088
2 0.022 0.062
3 0.004 0.019 0.052
4 -0.004 0.005 0.017 0.049
5 -0.010 -0.002 0.005 0.016 0.047
6 -0.015 -0.008 -0.002 0.005 0.018 0.052
7 -0.015 -0.010 -0.004 0.001 0.008 0.018 0.047
8 -0.016 -0.011 -0.007 -0.003 0.002 0.007 0.019 0.050
9 -0.017 -0.013 -0.009 -0.005 -0.002 0.001 0.010 0.020 0.052
10 -0.017 -0.013 -0.011 -0.007 -0.005 -0.002 0.005 0.012 0.022 0.060
TABLE 6
FIXED MODEL ESTIMATES OF WITHIN-MATCH ERROR COVARIANCE 
Combined Results From 3 Completed Data Implicates, Left-Censored Spells ExcludedTenure 123456789 1 0
1 0.124
2 0.066 0.094
3 0.052 0.066 0.094
4 0.047 0.059 0.070 0.099
5 0.041 0.053 0.063 0.075 0.098
6 0.036 0.049 0.058 0.068 0.078 0.104
7 0.031 0.045 0.054 0.064 0.072 0.083 0.107
8 0.030 0.043 0.052 0.063 0.071 0.078 0.086 0.115
9 0.032 0.043 0.051 0.062 0.068 0.075 0.081 0.091 0.118
10 0.030 0.041 0.051 0.061 0.066 0.072 0.077 0.083 0.092 0.119
Tenure 123456789 1 0
1 0.124
2 0.066 0.094
3 0.052 0.066 0.094
4 0.047 0.059 0.071 0.099
5 0.041 0.053 0.063 0.076 0.099
6 0.036 0.049 0.059 0.069 0.079 0.105
7 0.032 0.045 0.055 0.065 0.073 0.084 0.107
8 0.031 0.043 0.052 0.064 0.071 0.079 0.087 0.115
9 0.032 0.043 0.051 0.062 0.069 0.075 0.081 0.091 0.118
10 0.029 0.041 0.050 0.061 0.066 0.072 0.077 0.083 0.091 0.118
Combined Results From 3 Completed Data Implicates, Left-Censored Spells Excluded
No Correction for Truncation
Corrected for Truncation
TABLE 7












No Correction for Truncation
Variance of Measurement Error (σ
2
u ) 0.05 (0.000) 0.04 (0.001)
Variance of Match Quality (σ
2
c )
a 0.01 (0.000) 0.09 (0.004)
Variance of Initial Signal (σ
2
z )
a 0.97 (0.024) 0.10 (0.011)
Variance of Production Outcomes (σ
2
e )
a 0.07 (0.002) 0.15 (0.052)
p-value from Test of Overidentifying Restrictions < 0.0001 0.048
Corrected for Truncation
Variance of Measurement Error (σ
2
u ) 0.04 (0.002)












p-value from Test of Overidentifying Restrictions 0.039
a
  Estimates can be rescaled for alternate values 0<γ<1 by dividing the pararameter estimate by γ
2.
b   Average of parameter estimates across three completed data implicates.
c   Square root of total variance of parameter estimate across three completed data implicates, as defined in Rubin (1987).
TABLE 8
Fixed Model Mixed Model
Combined Results From 3 Completed Data Implicates, Left-Censored Spells Excluded
MINIMUM DISTANCE ESTIMATES OF STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS, SCALE PARAMETER γ=1Figure 1
Estimated Cubic Regression of 
































Mixed Model With Spherical Error, Corrected for Truncation
Mixed Model With W Unrestricted, Corrected for TruncationFigure 2






























































Mixed Model, No Correction for Truncation
Mixed Model, Corrected for Truncation
Fixed ModelFigure 3
Estimated Relationship Between Person Effect and Completed Job Duration
Mixed Model With Unrestricted Within-Match Error Covariance

































Not Corrected For Truncation. R-square=0.05
Corrected For Truncation, R-square=0.06
Figure 4
Estimated Relationship Between Firm Effect and Completed Job Duration
Mixed Model With Unrestricted Within-Match Error Covariance





























Not Corrected For Truncation, R-square=0.06
Corrected For Truncation, R-square=0.05Figure 5
Estimated Relationship Between Firm Effect and Log(1997 Employment)

































No Correction For Truncation, R-
square=0.02
Corrected For Truncation, R-square=0.01